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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Background of study 
 
In the last few decades, the topic of executive compensation has received a great 
deal of attention from both academic empirical researchers and practitioners of business 
management, especially those from the finance and accounting fields (Andjelkovic, 
Boyle, & McNoe, 2002; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002; Gray & Cannella, 
1997). The dominant topic of executive compensation studies has focused on examining 
the relationship between the executive’s compensation and the firm’s performance 
(Mishra, McConaughy, & Gobeli, 2000; Perry & Zenner, 2001). That is, executive 
compensation studies have been conducted on the basis of the pay-for-performance rule 
in the agency theory (Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). According to the agency 
theory, proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), compensation packages should balance 
compensation value and the executive’s managerial performance by implementing and 
utilizing an appropriate pay-for-performance rule aligned to motivate the agent (the 
executive in this study), to attract and retain management talent, and to increase 
management performance in order to maximize shareholder wealth (Gu & Choi, 2004; 
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Kim & Gu, 2005; Perlik, 2002). In other words, the agent’s compensation contract should 
lead the executives of the firms to try to increase the firm’s performance, thereby 
achieving the goal of maximization of shareholder’s wealth through an increase in the 
firm’s stock price and a stable flow of dividends (Lippert & Porter, 1997; Grabke-
Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). The pay-for-performance rule, then, supports the idea 
that the level of an executive’s compensation should be closely and positively linked to 
the firm’s performance (Hallock, 1998; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Kato & Kubo, 2006). 
Because of theoretical confidence in the pay-for-performance rule, it has become an 
increasingly popular measure in agency theory research (Lippert & Porter, 1997; Perry & 
Zenner, 2001). 
Even so, the pay-for-performance rule has not always been supported by the 
empirical results of executive compensation studies (Andjelkovic et al., 2002; Gray & 
Cannella, 1997). As the numbers of studies that have found other affects on executive 
compensation, such as executive’s demographic characteristics and the structure of 
corporate governance, have increased, the support for the pay-for-performance rule has 
decreased (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & Hinkin, 1987; Hebner & Kato, 1997; Nelson, 2005).  
In addition, the increasing attention on pay-for-performance among the public 
stimulated the development of regulations in the United States (Perry & Zenner, 2001). 
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced a new 
compensation disclosure rule, beginning with the fiscal year of 1992, which required 
publicly held companies to include top executives’ compensation disclosures in annual 
proxy statements to the SEC (Vafeas & Afxentiou, 1998). Congress also established tax 
legislation, Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, to limit executive’s 
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compensation’s deduction for non-performance-related executive compensation to US$1 
million in the publicly traded companies (Perry & Zenner, 2001). Both the SEC 
regulation and the tax legislation were expected to help determine clearer and more 
appropriate levels of executive compensation in U.S. publicly traded companies by 
encouraging companies to relate compensation to company performance (Perry & 
Zenner, 2001; Vafeas & Afxentiou, 1998).  
Today, the compensation packages of executives in publicly traded companies 
still have been spent huge amounts of money and have continually increased in value in 
order to attract and retain executives. For example, in 2006, Goldman Sachs’ CEO, Lloyd 
Blankfein, received compensation totaling $55 million in cash, stock options and 
restricted stock, a 76% increase in pre-tax compensation from 2005. John Mack, CEO of 
Morgan Stanley, increased his compensation to $41 million in 2006, a 43% increase from 
2005 (Hahn, 2007). In the retail industry, George L. Jones, the president and CEO of 
book retailer Borders Group, Inc., received $3.37 million in compensation during fiscal 
year 2006 (Financial Times Information, 2007b). Contrary to above examples of increase 
in top executive compensation, some top executives have voluntarily reduced their annual 
salaries, sometimes drastically. For example, Roger Enrico, CEO of PepsiCo, dropped his 
$900,000 salary to $1 in 1998, 1999 and 2000 and donated his previous salary to 
scholarships for employees’ kids. Steve Miller, CEO of Delphi, dropped his salary from 
$1.5 million to a $1 after the company filed for bankruptcy protection. Rick Wagoner, 
GM’s CEO, cut his salary almost 50% in 2005 and volunteered for another 50% cut in his 
$2.2 million salary in 2006 (Kempner, 2007). Although some examples show that top 
executive’s compensation is decreased by several reasons, it is true that most industries 
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still pay huge amounts of money to acquire and keep talented—and sometimes not-so-
talented—executives. While the value of executives’ compensation packages can vary in 
response to such factors as firm performance, the structure of other companies’ 
compensation packages, and voluntary cuts by the executive himself or herself, questions 
about efficient and appropriate executive compensation packages in publicly traded firms 
have increased as executive compensation has increased (Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-
Mejia, 2002).  
Since the agency theory was proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), numerous 
studies have been undertaken to find determinants of executive compensation. At the 
initial stage of executive compensation research, most studies were concerned with 
determining how executive compensation relates to financial performance standards 
(Carr, 1977; Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Firth, Tam, & Tang, 1999). As 
mentioned earlier, the pay-for-performance rule has not always been supported by the 
empirical results of executive compensation studies. Thus, some researchers made efforts 
to extend executive compensation study by adding other factors, especially factors from 
managerial power approach (Yermack, 1995; Core et al., 1999; Hallock, 1997; Bebchuk 
& Fried, 2003; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). Grinstein and Hribar (2004) stated the 
“managerial power approach,” which presents that compensation based on the pay-for-
performance rule did not work optimally to enforce agents to maximize shareholder 
wealth if the agent had powers or influence over board decisions, including compensation 
decisions (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). Based on the concept of the managerial power 
approach, researchers who questioned the pay-for-performance rule found that the 
characteristics of ownership structure and corporate governance also affected executive 
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compensation. As a result, research that investigates determinants of executive 
compensation should include variables such as ownership structure, number of board 
members, and whether the executive is on the company’s board of directors, so that both 
the pay-for-performance rule and the managerial power approach are considered in 
finding the determinants of executive compensation. 
 
 
2. Research Motive and Problem Statement 
 
Research Motive 
The hospitality industry is not much different from other industries when it comes 
to compensation for top executives. For example, in 2004, Starwood Hotels & Resorts 
appointed Maven Steven Heyer, former president and COO of the Coca-Cola Co., as its 
new CEO, with a $1 million annual base salary for a four-year initial term (Parets, 2004). 
The total compensation of David Brandon, CEO of Domino’s Pizza, Inc., increased from 
$1.81 million in 2004 to $21.9 million in 2006 (Snavely, 2006). The CEO of McDonalds, 
Jim Skinner, received $8.8 million in bonuses from 2004 to 2006 (Financial Times 
Information, 2007a).  
As in other industries, not all top executives in the hospitality industry have 
received huge compensation. The CEO of Planet Hollywood International, Robert Earl, 
was paid half of his $600,000 annual salary in 2001 because of bankruptcy (Schneider, 
2007). Tim Taft was appointed as the new CEO of Pizza Inn with a first-year salary of 
$1, although he received stock options (Robinson-Jacobs, 2005). These are examples of 
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the hospitality industry’s following the pay-for-performance rule, although there are 
many exceptions. For example, when Denny’s restaurant faced a loss of $88.5 million in 
company earnings before interest and taxes in 2002, the CEO received a $1.3 million 
bonus (Perlik, 2002). On the other hand, Joseph P. Martori, CEO of ILX Resorts 
Incorporated, named the number-two top-performing CEO in HVS International’s 2002 
Survey and beating out the CEOs of the Four Seasons, Marriott International, Starwood, 
Hilton and others, was one of the lowest-paid CEOs in the hotel industry, ranking 45th 
among 51 hospitality industry CEOs (Business Wire, 2003). Sometimes, then, the pay-
for-performance rule does not explain the determinants of top executives’ compensation 
in hospitality industry well.  
Clear understanding of the determinants of executive compensation is necessary 
for stockholders or potential investors in the hospitality industry to judge whether the 
appropriate compensation is awarded. Although the hospitality companies have spent 
large amounts on executives’ compensation packages, little research has been done to 
investigate how that compensation is determined in the industry. Previous literature 
related to executive compensation in the hospitality and tourism field has examined the 
determinants of CEO’s compensation only with regard to either financial variables from 
the firm’s performance (Gu & Choi, 2004; Kim & Gu, 2005) or to gender difference 
(Skalpe, 2007).  
 
Problem Statement 
Although previous studies have expanded our knowledge of what determines 
executive compensation in the hospitality industry, it remains uncertain whether 
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hospitality companies follow only the pay-for-performance rule or whether other factors 
have an influence on determining executive compensation in the hospitality industry. 
 
 
3. Significance of the Study 
 
Most literature related to executive compensation in the hospitality field has 
focused on financial determinants from the pay-for-performance rule (Gu & Choi, 2004; 
Kim & Gu, 2005; Skalpe, 2007). While the ownership structure and/or corporate 
governance variables from the managerial power approach have also been considered to 
be among the determinants of executive’s compensation for academic fields and other 
industries, to the best of my knowledge, there is no study that has considered whether the 
managerial power approach is a determinant of executive compensation in the hospitality 
industry. Therefore, this study combines the pay-for-performance rule and the managerial 
power approach, using both the financial variables from the pay-for-performance rule and 
the ownership and corporate governance variables from the managerial power approach, 
to investigate the determinants of executive compensation in the hospitality industry. In 
addition, Dyl (1988) found that the different types of industry influence on determining 
management compensation level. Other researchers also adopted a type of industry as 
dummy variable in their studies to examine whether the different type of industry 
influences on the level of the executive compensation (Dyl, 1988; Hallock, 1997; 
Yermack, 1995). Thus, this study also attempts to examine whether there is a difference 
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between different sectors (i.e., the hotel & casino vs. restaurant) in the hospitality 
industry regarding determinants of executive compensation. 
In terms of methodology, most research on executive compensation has used 
traditional multiple regression, such as Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression and 
Weighted Least Square (WLS) regression analysis, to investigate the relationship 
between total cash compensation and financial variables from the pay-for-performance 
rule. The current study adopted Quantile regression analysis, which was developed by 
Koenker and Basset (1978), to allow examination of whether different levels of total cash 
compensation are related differently to each independent variable from the pay-for-
performance rule and the managerial power approach. Unlike traditional multiple 
regression analysis, Quantile regression analysis is operated by a conditional quantile 
function that estimates the relationship between each independent variable and each 
segment (quantile) of the dependent variables. For this study, then, Quantile regression 
will allow us to investigate how each independent variable is related to each different 
segments of the executive’s total cash compensation. 
 
 
4. Purpose of the Study 
 
The primary objective of this study is to examine whether the financial 
performance variables from the pay-for-performance rule and a company’s ownership 
and corporate governance structure from the managerial power approach is related to 
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executive compensation in the hospitality industry. More specifically, the purpose of this 
study is to:  
1) Identify the determinants for executive compensation in the hospitality industry in 
terms of both the pay-for performance rule and the managerial power approach; 
2) Examine whether there is a difference between different sectors (i.e., the hotel & 
casino and restaurant) in the hospitality industry regarding determinants of 
executive compensation; and 
3) Investigate whether different levels of executive compensation are differently 
related to selected variables from both the pay-for-performance rule and the 
managerial power approach in the hospitality industry. 
 
 
5. Organization of the Study 
 
The composition of this study is as follows. Chapter I, the introduction section, 
presents the background, research motives, significance, and the purpose of the study. 
Chapter II, the literature review section, reviews previous literature dealing with agency 
theory, executive compensation with the pay-for-performance rule and managerial power 
approach, comparisons between OLS regression and Quantile regression analysis, and 
development of hypotheses for this study. Chapter III explains the research methodology, 
including data collection, sampling procedures, and data analysis and models. Chapter IV 
addresses the empirical results of the study and, finally, Chapter V concludes and 
discusses the study’s implications, contributions, and limitations. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
  
 
Numerous studies have tried to verify what factor(s) determine executive 
compensation. Two main streams of research concerning executive compensation in the 
finance and accounting fields have emerged over the last 70 years. The fundamental 
difference between the two streams of research lies in the theoretical foundations of 
executive compensation: the pay-for-performance rule from agency theory, which 
focuses on the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance; and 
the ownership structure and corporate governance from managerial power approach, 
which emphasizes that, because the pay-for-performance rule does not always work to 
determine executive’s compensation, other factors, such as whether the executive is 
involved in company ownership, board size, and whether the executive is a board 
member, also influence the executive’s compensation. While neither approach is perfect 
in explaining what determines executive compensation, they each have their advantages 
and disadvantages. A current trend in the literature is to combine both approaches.  
The goal of this literature review is to address the previous studies regarding the 
effect of financial determinants and managerial power on executive compensation and to 
identify relevant variables and methodologies used in previous studies. This chapter has 
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five main sections. The first section summarizes the agency theory, proposed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). The next two sections present the prior studies of executive 
compensation determinants from the pay-for-performance and the managerial power 
approaches, respectively. The fourth section compares OLS regression with Quantile 
regression for this study. The last section proposes the hypotheses for the study. 
 
 
1. The Agency Theory  
 
In traditional financial theory, the primary goal of business management is 
maximization of stockholder wealth in terms of maximization of the firm’s market value. 
Because of this, those who invest money in the company expect executives not only to 
improve their business processes but to increase the company’s value (Brigham, 
Gapenski, & Ehrhardt, 1999), so spending money for executive compensation is one of 
the investments shareholders make to maximize their wealth.  
In contrast to the traditional financial theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
proposed “the agency problem” within the agency theory, which is that there is a conflict 
between the agent’s interests and the shareholders’ interests because of the separation of 
management from ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In other words, the agent (the 
executives, in this case) is more likely to pursue personal interests or goals than to 
maximize shareholders’ wealth (Dyl, 1988; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Traichal, 
Gallinger, & Johnson, 1999). This conflict between agent and shareholder evokes several 
types of costs for shareholders. This “agent cost” is composed primarily of three types of 
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costs: monitoring cost, bonding cost, and residual loss. Monitoring cost is the cost for the 
principal (the shareholder in this case) to limit the discretionary behavior of the agent. 
Bonding cost refers to the costs for the agent (the executive, in this case) to guarantee his 
or her discretionary behavior. Residual loss is loss from conflicts between principals and 
agents (Dyl, 1988; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   
Several remedies have been proposed to solve the agency problem, including 
monitoring the agent’s discretionary behavior and controlling the agent’s compensation 
packages (Dyl, 1988; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Traichal et al., 1999) by providing 
sufficient agent compensation to motivate the executive to work toward the best interests 
of shareholders, i.e., achieving maximization of shareholder wealth (Kim & Gu, 2005).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) also suggested that executive compensation could be 
determined by means of the pay-for-performance rule, which would establish an optimal 
compensation contract between agent and principal. According to the pay-for-
performance rule in agency theory, the agent’s compensation should be determined by 
practical and reliable measures of firm performance, that is, the level of the agent’s 
compensation would be commensurate with his or her contribution to the firm’s value. In 
this context, compensation should be based on observable measures, such as market 
returns or profitability ratios, which maximize the value of a firm (Grinstein & Hribar, 
2004). The pay-for-performance rule is frequently utilized as a standard by which to 
determine executive compensation by using firm performance (Gu & Choi, 2004). Thus, 
many extant studies have investigated the relationship between executive compensation 
and firm performance using several key financial variables, including firm size and 
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several types of firm performance measures (Anderson, Becher, & Campbell, 2004; 
Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Gu & Choi, 2004, Kato & Kubo, 2006; Kim & Gu, 2005). 
 
 
2. Financial Determinants of Executive Compensation 
 
Most executive compensation studies have adopted the firm’s performance in 
terms of the firm’s financial data, as estimators of each executive’s performance because 
of the difficulty of collecting relevant or sufficient data regarding executives’ direct 
contribution on firm performance. In other words, it is difficult to estimate each 
executive’s direct performance on the firm’s performance with financial and 
mathematical figures. The agency theory also suggests that executives’ managerial 
performance leads to improvement in the firm’s performance, which, in turn, links to 
increasing shareholder wealth (Gu & Choi, 2004).  
At the initial stage of executive compensation research, especially after Jensen 
and Meckling proposed the agency theory in 1976, the financial measures from the pay-
for-performance rule were probably the most common measure utilized in research on 
determinants of executive compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Gomez-Mejia 
&Wiseman, 1997). Even though some critics decry the financial measures from the pay-
for-performance rule, numerous studies have utilized the financial measures for firm 
performance. Thus, following these prior studies provides the theoretical justification for 
the current study to utilize relevant variables for measuring firm performance.  
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To measure the firm’s performance, researchers have adopted several types of 
financial figures as relevant variables. The three dominant streams of measurement in 
prior empirical executive compensation studies in the finance and accounting fields are 
market-based measurements, accounting-based measurements, and growth-based 
measurements. First, the company’s market return in terms of stock returns is an indirect 
measure of a firm’s market-based performance, because it is an important indicator of its 
business performance and shareholder wealth (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Leone, Wu, & 
Zimmerman, 2006). Financial figures such as return on assets, earnings per share, and 
return on equity, are accounting-based measures of firm performance. The accounting-
based ratio analysis is one of the tools used by financial managers and financial analysts 
to evaluate the financial position or performance of a firm (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2005). 
Finally, many studies have utilized the firm’s sales growth as a growth-based determinant 
of executive compensation (Firth et al., 1999; Kato & Kubo, 2006). Many prior studies of 
executive compensation based on the pay-for-performance rule have also used firm size 
as a control variable (Andjelkovic et al., 2002). Studies that followed often adopted these 
four financial measurements of firm performance in executive compensation research. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) examined the association between top management’s 
pay and performance, adopting shareholder wealth in terms of stock returns as an 
estimator of managerial performance. The study found that top management 
compensation is highly sensitive to the stock returns of the company. One other example 
of a study regarding the sensitivity of stock returns on executive compensation was 
conducted by Leone et al. (2006). The authors examined the sensitivity of CEO cash 
compensation to stock returns with 9,858 CEOs in the ExecuComp database from 1993 to 
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2003 and found that CEO cash compensation is twice as sensitive to negative stock 
returns as it is to positive stock returns. The results supports that company’s stock return 
positively influence on determining CEO cash compensation. In addition, the reducing 
amount of CEO cash compensation in company with negative stock return is bigger than 
the increasing amount of CEO cash compensation in company with positive stock return. 
Gray and Cannella (1997) examined the role of firm’s risk in executive 
compensation, using several financial figures to identify the relationship between 
executive compensation and firm risks, return on sales, and firm size. The results of the 
study provided that firm risks have a significantly negative relationship with executive 
total compensation and firm size, and Jensen’s alpha has a significantly positive 
association with executive total compensation. The findings from this study supports that 
the executive compensation is determined by firm’s performance. Furthermore, the 
executive compensation is reduced when firm’s risk increases, as well as the executive 
compensation is increased when firm’s size and firm’s performance increase. 
Duru and Iyengar (1999) conducted a cross-sectional research analysis of 225 
firms in the electric utility industry (SIC code 4931) from 1992 to 1995 to examine the 
association between firm performance and CEO compensation components. The authors 
adopted the change in CEO compensation as the dependent variable and the changes in 
the firm’s financial figures as multiple independent variables to examine the sensitivity of 
CEO compensation to changes in firm performance. They used market returns, return on 
assets, earning per share, operating cash flow per share, and growth in sales to measure 
financial performance and showed a positive relationship between changes in 
compensation and changes in firm performance. More specifically, executive bonuses 
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were sensitive to changes in market return, and executive stock options were sensitive to 
changes in sales growth.  
Several studies have examined the relationship between executive compensation 
and firm performance during special events, like mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 
Anderson et al. (2003) investigated bank CEOs’ managerial incentives for bank mergers 
as they related to financial variables such as firm size and stock returns, and found that 
CEO compensation was in line with an increase in bank size, regardless of whether a 
merger or acquisition created value. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) also used financial 
variables, including firm size and ROA, stock return, and sales growth, to examine the 
determinants of CEOs’ bonuses for 327 large ($1 billion or more) M&A deals in publicly 
traded U.S. companies between 1993 and 1999. They found the firm size, ROA, stock 
return, and the acquisition dummy to be positively correlated with CEOs’ bonuses for the 
M&A deal.  
Some studies of executive compensation determinants have been performed in 
countries outside the U.S., such as Japan (Kato & Kubo, 2006), England (Eichholtz, Kok, 
& Otten, 2008), and China (Firth et al., 1999). Kato and Kubo (2006) examined the 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance for Japanese firms 
from 1986 to 1995 using market-based firm performance (stock returns), accounting-
based firm performance (return on asset), growth-based firm performance (sales growth), 
and firm size. The results of this study supported that Japanese CEOs’ cash compensation 
was sensitive to firm performance (especially accounting-based performance) and that the 
bonus system made CEO compensation more responsive to firm performance. Eichholtz 
et al. (2008) used samples from 39 companies in the UK property industry from 1998 to 
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2003 and variables from both firm performance and corporate governance—total stock 
performance, Jensen alpha, earnings per share, dividend yield, and discount—to 
investigate the association between executive compensation and firm performance. They 
found that stock performance, Jensen alpha, earnings per share, and discount were not 
significantly related to executive cash compensation but that dividend yield was 
significantly negatively related to executive cash compensation. Thus, the study found a 
weak association between executive cash compensation and the pay-for-performance 
rule.  
Firth et al. (1999) used a sample of companies in Hong Kong and several 
variables from both the pay-for-performance rule and the managerial power approach—
annual stock return, firm size, return on shareholder equity, and annual compound sales 
growth—and found that the companies in Hong Kong followed pay-for-performance 
rule, by showing that company size and accounting profitability are significantly related 
with executive compensation. Thus, executive compensation studies of three different 
countries cautiously supported an association between executive compensation and firm 
performance.  
Most research has measured firm performance with market-based, accounting-
based (mostly profitability measures), and growth-based measures, as well as a control 
variable for firm size. However, other types of accounting based financial ratios have 
been used to represent for firm performance in the accounting literature. The basic 
accounting-based financial ratios are generally divided into four categories: liquidity, 
activity, profitability, and coverage. Liquidity ratios are used to measure the company’s 
short-run ability to pay its maturing obligations, activity ratios measure how effectively 
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and efficiently a company uses its assets, profitability ratios are measures of the degree of 
success or failure of company for a given period of time, and coverage ratios measure the 
protection of long-term creditors and investors (Brigham et al., 1999; Chatfield & Dalbor, 
2005; Gallagher & Andrew, 1997; Kieso, Weygandt, & Warfield, 2001). Although most 
studies have adopted profitability ratios for firm performance from among the four 
classified accounting based ratio analyses, other ratios, like liquidity, activity and 
coverage ratios, might also be considered as measures of firm performance for the current 
study.  
Ortiz-Molina (2007) stated that executive compensation may not only depend on 
shareholder opinion, because the bondholders (debtors) but also have the power to 
influence executive compensation. Thus, Ortiz-Molina found that executive 
compensation was significantly sensitive to the types of debt in a company. Traichal et al. 
(1999) affirmed the importance of liquidity ratios and coverage ratios in executive 
compensation and adopted a modified liquidity ratio (ratio of short-term debt divided by 
total assets) and coverage ratio (ratio of long-term debt divided by total assets). Since 
those two liquidity and coverage ratios are measurements that show the ability of a firm 
to pay back both short-term and long-term debt, those two ratios may also be considered 
measurements of firm performance. In addition, some studies of executive compensation 
in the hospitality field have included all four types of accounting-based financial 
measurements (liquidity, efficiency, profitability, and coverage) as independent variables 
for their executive compensation studies (Gu & Choi, 2004; Kim & Gu, 2005). In a 
related study in the hospitality field, Cauvin (1979a) investigated the relationship 
between executive total compensation and company size, represented by sales, with 33 
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lodging companies in the U.S. Since the study was conducted before the SEC’s 
regulation requiring disclosure of top executive compensation disclosure was announced, 
the data for this study were collected from surveys based on the 1978 directory of 
Hotel/Motel Systems, published by the American Hotel and Motel Association. The 
author found that the relationship between executive total compensation and company 
sales was not similar, unlike the results from the studies in other industries. The results 
indicated that the executive total compensation in small hotel companies was equal to or 
more than the executive total compensation in large hotel companies. Cauvin investigated 
the relationship between executive compensation and company sales again in 1979, this 
time conducting nine simple regressions to examine the relationship between executive 
compensation in each of nine executive positions. The results showed that there was less 
relationship between executive compensation and company sales in the lodging industry 
than in other fields (Cauvin, 1979b). 
More recently, Gu and Choi (2004) researched the determinants of CEO 
compensation in the casino industry, using several types of financial measurements for 
firm performance: market-based firm performance (annual change of stock price), 
accounting-based firm performance (return on assets for firm profitability, asset turnover 
ratio for firm efficiency, long-term debt ratio for firm debt leverage), and firm size (total 
assets). The results supported that profitability, firm size, debt leverage, and stock options 
were positively related to CEO cash compensation, while revenue efficiency (i.e., asset 
turnover) was negatively correlated. Kim and Gu (2005) also studied the determinants of 
CEO cash compensation in the restaurant industry based on the pay-for-performance rule 
using firm size, sales growth, ROI, and stock returns. The authors found that CEOs’ cash 
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compensation was positively associated with firm size and operating efficiency, while 
growth, debt leverage, profitability, and stock performance were not related. In addition, 
Namasivayam, Miao, and Zhao (2007) investigated the relationship between 
compensation and firm performance for 1,223 hotel companies in the U.S. using data 
gathered from the Hospitality Compensation and Benefit Survey of Smith Travel 
Research in 2001 to 2003. Unlike other studies of executive compensation in the 
hospitality industry or other industries, the authors adopted RevPar (Revenue per 
available room) as the hotels’ performance measurement. The results showed that both 
individual salary and benefits were significantly positively related to hotel performance 
for both management and non-management employees. 
For the tourism industry, Skalpe (2007) examined the differences in CEO pay 
between Norway’s tourism and manufacturing industries with regard to the CEOs’ 
gender and age, as well as financial variables that included firm size and firm 
performance. The study found that there was a difference in CEO pay between genders in 
both industries, although the smaller companies showed a greater difference. A difference 
in salary by gender is particularly significant for the tourism industry because more 
female CEOs work in the tourism industry than in the manufacturing industry. 
As a result of extensive literature reviews of studies in the accounting and finance 
literature on executive compensation based on pay-for-performance rule, four major 
categories for measuring firm’s performance can be identified: market-based firm 
performance, accounting-based firm performance, growth-based performance, and firm 
size. Table 2-1 shows a summary of the financial variables used in prior studies of 
executive compensation determinants. These financial variables can be utilized as the 
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basis by which select relevant variables of financial determinants for executive 
compensation in the current study. 
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Table 2-1. The classification of financial variables from the previous studies 
Type Variable Studies 
Total Asset (TA) 
Anderson et al. (2003); Firth et al. (1999); 
Grinstein & Hribar (2004); Gu & Choi 
(2004); Kim & Gu (2005);Traichal et al. 
(1999) Firm size 
Sales Volume (SV) Cauvin (1979); Gray & Cannella (1997); Leone et al (2006); Skalpe (2007); 
Stock Return  
(SR) 
Anderson et al. (2003); Andjelkovic et al 
(2002); Duru & Iyengar (1999); Eichholtz et 
al (2008); Firth et al. (1999); Grinstein & 
Hribar (2004); Gu & Choi (2004); Jensen & 
Murphy (1990); Kato & Kubo (2006); Leone 
et al (2006); Traichal et al(1999) 
Return on Asset 
(ROA) 
Andjelkovic et al (2002); Duru & Iyengar 
(1999); Grinstein & Hribar (2004); Gu & 
Choi (2004); Kato & Kubo (2006);Leone et 
al (2006); Skalpe (2007); 
Return on Investment 
(ROI) 
Gomez-Mejia et al (1987); Kim & Gu 
(2005); 
Return on Sales   
(ROS) Gray & Cannella, Jr (1997); 
Return on Equity  
(ROE) 
Andjelkovic et al (2002); Firth et al. (1999); 
Gomez-Mejia et al (1987); Traichal et 
al(1999) 
Earnings per Share  
(EPS) 
Duru & Iyengar (1999); Eichholtz et al 
(2008); Gomez-Mejia et al (1987); Perry & 
Zenner (2001) 
Firm  
 
Profitability 
Sales Growth  
(GS) 
Duru & Iyengar (1999); Firth et al. (1999); 
Gomez-Mejia et al (1987); Grinstein & 
Hribar (2004); Kato & Kubo (2006); Kim & 
Gu (2005) 
Firm Liquidity Fixed Assets Turnover (FAT) Kim & Gu (2005) 
Firm Activity Asset Turnover (AT) Gu & Choi (2004); Kim & Gu (2005) 
Debt ratio (DT) Kim & Gu (2005) 
Firm Coverage 
Long Term Debt (LTD) Gu & Choi (2004); Traichal et al(1999) 
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3. Managerial Power Determinants of Executive Compensation 
 
Recent academic research has found it difficult to explain the determinants of 
executive compensation using only firm performance because numerous empirical results 
have supported that the pay-for-performance rule does not always work in determining 
executive compensation (Conyon, 1997; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987). Thus, researchers 
have turned their sights to finding other factors that might influence executive 
compensation, such as demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, and education 
level), compensation structure (e.g., the composition of compensation with stock options 
and cash compensation), and the variables from the managerial power approach (e.g., 
stock ownership, board size, compensation committee size) (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 
2001; Nelson, 2005). Among those attempts to address other determinants of executive 
compensation, the dominant theoretical foundation is the managerial power approach 
proposed by Ouch and Maguire in 1975 (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). 
According to traditional financial theory, especially agency theory, the board of a 
company can control an agent (executive) with compensation packages. However, the 
managerial power approach suggests that the executive would not consider shareholder 
wealth if he or she had the power to influence the board’s decision-making; that is, if the 
executive has enough governance power to affect the board’s decision process in 
establishing the executive’s compensation contract, the traditional financial view based 
on the pay-for-performance rule may not be an appropriate approach to finding the 
determinants of executive compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Core et al., 1999; 
Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Hallock, 1998; Yermack, 1995). Thus, the managerial power 
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approach has been combined with the pay-for-performance rule in recent empirical 
studies on executive compensation. 
There are two main components of the managerial power approach: stock 
ownership structure and board independence. For the stock ownership structure’s impact 
on executive compensation, the CEO who possesses a higher portion of the company’s 
outstanding stocks could have more power in the company and be more likely to use 
corporate resources for his or her own benefit (Khan, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2005). 
Thus, the executive with high stock ownership would extract greater overall levels of 
compensation (Ozkan, 2007). In other words, the level of executive compensation would 
be higher when the executive has higher stock ownership (Toyne, Millar, & Dixon, 
2000). In addition, higher executive possession of company’s outstanding stocks would 
influence the composition of board members, because the voting rights to select directors 
are distributed according to the amount of company stock held. Thus, an executive who 
owns a great deal of stock may have enough power to affect his or her own compensation 
level by selecting sympathetic board members (Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002).  
Since the board of directors decides the level of executive compensation, the 
independence of the board has been regarded as one of the key factors in determining 
executive compensation. However, it is not always easy to keep the board independent of 
top executives in the company. For example, outside members of the board are less likely 
to conflict with the CEO when the CEO appoints the outside members. Furthermore, the 
board of directors tends to follow the opinion of compensation consultants who are hired 
by the CEO (Core et al., 1999). As a result, executive compensation might not be 
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determined with the company’s best interests in mind (Core et al., 1999). Therefore, the 
independence of the board should be considered in an executive compensation study. 
Numerous studies have been conducted to examine the association between 
executive compensation and selected variables from the managerial power approach. 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987) studied the effect of ownership structure on CEO 
compensation by classifying sample companies into two categories using the 5 percent 
ownership convention (referring to whether one individual or organization holds more 
than five percent of the company’s outstanding stock and may, therefore, be able to affect 
decisions): management-controlled companies and owner-controlled companies. The 
firm’s performance and size measures were also included in the study, which found that 
ownership structure significantly influenced the level of CEO compensation such that 
CEO in externally controlled firms receive more compensation on the basis of firm 
performance than do CEOs in internally controlled firms. Thus, executive compensation 
would be more likely to follow the pay-for-performance rule in externally controlled 
firms, and executive stock ownership is a key factor in determining executive 
compensation.  
Core et al. (1999) also researched the effect of corporate governance on executive 
compensation with 495 CEOs in 205 publicly traded U.S. firms. The authors utilized 
several relevant variables from both financial performance and the managerial power 
approach to identify determinants of executive compensation. Among the managerial 
power variables were board size, composition of board membership, whether the CEO 
served as chairperson of the board, and the CEO’s percentage of stock ownership. The 
authors found that there is a significantly negative relationship between CEO 
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compensation and board and ownership structure and concluded that CEOs received 
greater compensation when governance structures were less effective. Likewise, 
Yermack (1996) found that companies with small boards provided stronger CEO 
performance incentives from compensation. Other studies that investigated the 
relationship between CEO compensation and corporate governance from managerial 
power approach included that of Bebchuk and Fried (2003), which found that the CEO 
could influence board decisions by controlling the information about the company to 
board members and controlling the meeting time and agenda.  
Several studies have examined the relationship between executive compensation 
and relevant variables from the managerial power approach in different countries, such as 
China (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2007), the United Kingdom (Ozkan, 2007), and Israel (Cohen 
& Lauterbach, 2008). Firth et al. (2007) examined how ownership structure and corporate 
governance influenced CEOs’ compensation in Chinese companies. They adopted 
variables based on the theoretical concepts from both the pay-for-performance and 
managerial power approaches. Board size, proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board, and a dummy variable (whether the CEO and the chairman of the board are the 
same person) were used to examine the effect of managerial power on CEO 
compensation. The study revealed that type of ownership and board size affected CEO 
compensation, as independent boards or non-executive directors of boards were more 
likely to implement performance-related pay.  
Using board size, the composition of non-executive directors on board, and CEO 
stock ownership, Ozkan (2007) investigated how corporate governance influenced CEO 
compensation in 414 U.K. companies and found that larger board size and a higher 
 27 
proportion of non-executive directors on the boards resulted in higher CEO 
compensation; thus, less corporate governance of executives led to higher executive 
compensation. Finally, Cohen and Lauterbach (2008) researched CEO compensation, as 
it related to company ownership, with 124 publicly traded firms in Israel from 1994 to 
2001. The authors included independent variables of firm performance, firm size, board 
composition, demographics (education level and age), and company ownership and found 
that CEOs in CEO-owned companies received significantly higher compensation than did 
CEOs who did not own part of the company. In addition, the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity was lower in CEO-owned companies than in non-CEO owned companies, 
even though the difference was not statistically significant. These results also indicated 
that the CEOs who owned more company stock received higher compensation than did 
CEOs who owned less company stock, regardless of firm performance. Thus, executive 
compensation was related to corporate governance in a variety of different countries. 
The extant literature demonstrates that the importance of the managerial power 
approach has increased and that combinations of variables from the pay-for-performance 
and the managerial power approaches have come to the fore in executive compensation 
studies. Thus, the managerial power approach should be considered for the current study 
in order to derive more concise and meaningful information, so both the pay-for-
performance and the managerial power approaches shall be included in this study. Table 
2-2 summarizes selected variables from the managerial power approach used in prior 
studies which will form the basis of variables of managerial power determinants in this 
study. 
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Table 2-2. The variables of managerial power approach used in previous studies 
Type Variables Studies 
Executive 
shares 
Cohen & Lauterbach (2008); Core et al. (1999); 
Coles et al. (2001); Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987); 
Khan et al. (2005); Ozkan (2007) 
Ownership 
Ownership 
Composition 
Core et al. (1999); Coles et al. (2001); Firth et al. 
(2007); Khan et al. (2005); Ozkan (2006); Toyne et 
al. (2000) 
Board size 
(Number of 
Board Director) 
Core et al. (1999); Firth et al. (2007);  Grinstein & 
Hribar (2004); Hallock(1997); Ozkan (2007); 
Yermack (1995) 
Board 
Structure 
Cohen & Lauterbach (2008); Core et al. (1999); 
Coles et al. (2001); Firth et al. (2007); Grinstein & 
Hribar (2004); 
Board 
Independence 
Executive as 
Director 
(CEO as 
Board of chair) 
Conyon (1997); Core et al. (1999); Firth et al. 
(2007); Grinstein & Hribar (2004); 
 
 
4. OLS regression and Quantile regression  
 
Several types of multiple regression analyses have been utilized in prior empirical 
studies to examine the relationship between executive compensation and selected 
variables based on pay-for-performance, managerial power, and demographic 
characteristics. These have included multivariate logistic regression (Gray & Cannella, 
1997; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Nelson, 2005), weighted least-squares (WLS) regression 
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(Gu & Choi, 2004; Kim & Gu, 2005), and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
(Anderson et al., 2004; Core et al., 1999; Dyl, 1988; Firth et al., 2007; Firth et al., 1999; 
Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Hebner & Kato, 1997; Kato & 
Kubo, 2006; Traichal et al., 1999). Clearly, most researchers have used OLS regression 
analysis in these efforts. OLS regression achieves the parameter estimates of the model 
(model fit) and illuminates the relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables through the conditional mean function (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, 
& Li, 2005; Pedhazur, 1997). The conditional mean function uses the conditional mean 
response to examine the relationship between the dependent variable and independent 
variable(s) (Hao & Naiman, 2007). One of the crucial factors in conducting OLS 
regression is reducing a heteroscedasticity problem by minimizing the sums of squared 
residuals in the regression equation. However, OLS regression analysis has been 
criticized for failing to minimize the sums of squared residuals in the regression equation 
(Koenker, 2005) because it is difficult to follow the equal variance of variables for social 
phenomena in the real world (Hao & Naiman, 2007).   
Because of this criticism, Koenker and Basset (1978) developed a new 
mechanism of regression analysis, called quantile regression analysis, which uses a 
conditional quantile function instead of a conditional mean. Quantile regression analysis 
can be used to examine the relationship between the dependent variable and independent 
variable(s) by estimating each quantile of response variables based on the conditional 
quantile function (Koenker & Hallock, 2001); thus, it can achieve flexibility by 
estimating a change in the entire range of the dependent variable through a change in 
each independent variable (Hao & Naiman, 2007). As a result, quantile regression 
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analysis has gradually emerged as the way to estimate the responses of various levels of a 
population from each independent variable (Koenker & Machado, 1999).  
More specifically, the conditional mean function in the OLS regression enables to 
estimate the coefficient of each independent variable by taking the value of parameters 
that minimize the sum of squared residuals. In other words, OLS regression minimizes 
the sum of squared vertical distances between data points (Xi, Yi) and the fitted 
line 10 βˆ+βˆ=Yˆ  (Hao & Naiman, 2007; Koenker, 2005; Koenker & Basset, 1978). The 
model for estimating the coefficient of OLS regression is shown as follows:  
Min 210 ))β+β( -Υ( iii x∑  
However, the conditional quantile function enables to estimate the coefficients of 
independent variables that minimize the sum of absolute residuals. In other words, 
quantile regression minimizes the sum of absolute vertical distances between observed 
value to its fitted value. The model for estimating the coefficient of median-regression 
line is follows: 
Min )β+β( -Υ 10 iii x∑  
The median regression line should pass through a pair of sample, by half of data 
should be in the above median regression line, as well as the last half of data should be in 
the below median regression line (Hao & Naiman, 2007). By modifying above median 
regression function, the estimation of coefficients for pth quantile regression is derived as 
shown below:  
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As shown above pth quantile regression model, pth quantile regression enables to 
estimate the coefficients )(0βˆ
p
and )(1βˆ
p
 by using the weighted sum of distances between 
fitted values from )(1
)(
0 β
ˆ+βˆ=ˆ
pp
iY   and the observed value of Yi, where 0 < P < 1 (Hao & 
Naiman, 2007; Koenker, 2005; Koenker & Bassett, 1978).  
In addition, Koenker and Hallock (2001) used one example of a CEO 
compensation topic to illustrate the need for quantile regression analysis for executive 
compensation study. They derived 1999 data from the EXECUCOMP database for CEO 
annual compensation in 1,660 firms and showed that executive compensation tends to 
increase with firm size. However, the low and high levels of CEO annual compensation 
were more highly related to firm size than were the middle range of CEO annual 
compensation, indicating that different levels of CEO compensation were differently 
related to firm size. The authors insisted that those kinds of results would be more 
frequent and would create more difficulty in explaining the relationship between 
executive compensation and covariates with OLS regression analysis when the sample 
size is larger and more covariates are included in the study. Thus, they suggested that 
quantile regression analysis would be a more effective method than the OLS method for 
executive compensation studies.  
In the current study, quantile regression analysis also enables examination of 
whether different levels of executive total cash compensation are related differently to 
each independent variable.  More specific and concise results are expected from quantile 
regression analysis than would be expected from OLS regression analysis. 
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5. Development of Hypotheses  
 
Two main hypotheses for this study are proposed for examining the determinants 
of executive cash compensation in the hospitality industry using OLS regression and 
quantile regression with selected variables from both the pay-for-performance and the 
managerial power approach. The two main hypotheses were tested for three classes of 
samples: for Ha, all hospitality industry (H1), hotel and casino industry (H2), and 
restaurant industry (H3); and for Hb, and all hospitality industry (H4), hotel and casino 
industry (H5), and restaurant industry (H6). 
 
Hypotheses A 
Ha: The selected variables from both the pay-for-performance rule and the managerial 
power approach are significantly correlated with executive cash compensation in the 
hospitality industry. 
Ha-1: The firm’s current ratio (CR) is significantly correlated with executive cash 
compensation in the hospitality industry.  
Ha-2: The firm’s asset turnover (AT) is significantly correlated with executive 
cash compensation in the hospitality industry.  
Ha-3: The firm’s debt-to-asset ratio (DT) is significantly correlated with executive 
cash compensation in the hospitality industry.  
Ha-4: Firm size (FS) is significantly correlated with executive cash compensation 
in the hospitality industry. 
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Ha-5: The firm’s Earnings per Share (EPS) is significantly correlated with 
executive cash compensation in the hospitality industry.  
Ha-6: The firm’s sales growth (GS) is significantly correlated with executive cash 
compensation in the hospitality industry.  
Ha-7: The type of executive (whether the executive is a director or not: PDIR) is 
significantly correlated with executive cash compensation in the hospitality 
industry. 
Ha-8: The board size (the number of directors on the board: NDIR) is 
significantly correlated with executive cash compensation in the hospitality 
industry. 
Ha-9: The compensation committee size (the number of directors on the 
compensation committee: NCCMT) is significantly correlated with executive cash 
compensation in the hospitality industry. 
Ha-10: The number of the executive’s equity shares (Dummy variable: whether 
the executive has more than 5% of outstanding common stocks of company: SO) 
is significantly correlated with the executive cash compensation in the hospitality 
industry.  
 
One additional set of hypotheses was proposed for the quantile regression method. 
Each selected variable from both the pay-for-performance rule and the managerial power 
approach was tested by different levels of executive total cash compensation, leading to 
the following hypothesis:  
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Hypotheses B 
Hb: The selected variables from both the pay-for-performance rule and the managerial 
power approach are differently correlated with different levels of executive cash 
compensation in the hospitality industry. 
Hb-1: The firm’s current ratio (CR) is differently correlated with different levels 
of executive cash compensation in the hospitality industry.  
Hb-2: The firm’s asset turnover (AT) is differently correlated with different levels 
of executive cash compensation in the hospitality industry.  
Hb-3: The firm’s debt-to-asset ratio (DT) is differently correlated with different 
levels of executive cash compensation in the hospitality industry.  
Hb-4: Firm size (FS) is differently correlated with different levels of executive 
cash compensation in the hospitality industry. 
Hb-5: The firm’s Earnings per Share (EPS) is differently correlated with different 
levels of executive cash compensation in the hospitality industry.  
Hb-6: The firm’s sales (GS) is differently correlated with different levels of 
executive cash compensation in the hospitality industry.  
Hb-7: The type of executive (whether the executive is a director: PDIR) is 
differently correlated with different levels of executive cash compensation in the 
hospitality industry. 
Hb-8: Board size (the number of directors on the board: NDIR) is differently 
correlated with different levels of executive cash compensation in the hospitality 
industry. 
 35 
Hb-9: Compensation committee size (the number of directors on the 
compensation committee: NCCMT) is differently correlated with different levels 
of executive cash compensation in the hospitality industry. 
Hb-10: The number of the executive’s equity shares (Dummy variable: whether 
the executive has more than 5% of outstanding company common stocks: SO) is 
differently correlated with different levels of executive cash compensation in the 
hospitality industry. 
 36 
CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
1. Data Collection and Sampling Procedures 
 
The main objective of this study is to examine which elements from the two 
approaches, financial performance and managerial power, are linked to executive cash 
compensation in the hospitality industry. Sample data were gathered from secondary 
databases, Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database and proxy statements (DEF 14A) 
from SEC filings. The data collection procedure for this study was divided into two main 
processes: gathering firms’ financial data from the COMPUSTAT database to calculate 
financial measurements and collecting executive compensation data and data related to 
the managerial power approach from the proxy statements from SEC filings.  
If a company’s data was not available for one of following procedures, the 
observation was eliminated from the sample. The sample companies were limited to the 
companies that were on the list of COMPUSTAT database. Among the several 
subsidiaries of the hospitality industry were three major sectors: hotels, casinos, and 
restaurants. 
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1. Financial data for the sample companies were retrieved for each of the three main 
sectors of the hospitality industry from the COMPUSTAT database using 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. A total of 150 hospitality company 
samples were collected. 
1) Hotel Industry 
The initial sample consisted of all hotel companies (SIC code 7011). After 
excluding companies that did not have financial data for either 2005 or 2006, 
15 hotel companies remained in the sample. 
2) Casino Industry 
The initial sample consisted of all casino companies (SIC code 7990). After 
excluding companies that did not have financial data for either 2005 or 2006, 
49 casino companies remained in the sample. 
3) Restaurant Industry 
The initial sample consisted of all restaurant companies (SIC code 5812). 
After excluding companies that did not have financial data for either 2005 or 
2006, 86 restaurant companies remained in the sample. 
2. The 150 hospitality companies in the sample were matched to the SEC filing list 
to find executive compensation data and data related to the managerial power 
approach. After the matching process, 83 hospitality companies remained in the 
sample. 
1) Hotel Industry 
Seven hotel companies were eliminated from the sample either because they 
were not listed in the SEC filings or because they didn’t have proxy 
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statements (DEF 14A) for 2005 and 2006. After excluding the 7 companies, 8 
hotel companies remained in the sample. 
2) Casino Industry 
Twenty-eight casino companies were eliminated from the sample either 
because they were not listed in the SEC filing lists or because they didn’t 
have proxy statements (DEF 14A) for 2005 and 2006. After excluding the 28 
companies, 21 casino companies remained in the sample 
3) Restaurant Industry 
Thirty-two restaurant companies were eliminated from the sample either 
because they were not listed in the SEC filing lists or because they didn’t 
have proxy statements (DEF 14A) for 2005 and 2006. After excluding the 32 
companies, 54 casino companies remained in the sample. 
3. Executive compensation and data related to the managerial power approach were 
retained from the proxy statements of the 83 hospitality companies for 2005 and 
2006. Initially, data for 388 executives were gathered; after filtering, 331 
executives’ data remained. 
1) Filtering Executives’ data from the Hotel Industry 
The initial executive sample included 44 executives in 8 hotel companies. 
Nine executives were missing compensation data for either 2005 or 2006 and 
were eliminated, leaving 35 executives in the sample.  
2) Filtering Executives’ data from the Casino Industry 
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The initial executive sample included 104 executives in 21 hotel companies. 
Seventeen executives were missing compensation data for either 2005 or 2006 
and were eliminated, leaving 87 executives in the sample.  
3) Filtering Executives’ data from the Restaurant Industry 
The initial executive sample included 240 executives in 54 hotel companies. 
Thirty-one executives were missing compensation data from either 2005 or 
2006, leaving 209 executives in the sample.  
4. With a total of 331 executives’ data remaining, the data was filtered again to 
remove executives who had a greater than 100% change in total cash 
compensation from 2005 to 2006 because such an unusual change in executive 
total cash compensation could skew results. 
1) In the Hotel Industry 
One executive was removed because the executive had a greater than 100% 
change in total cash compensation from 2005 to 2006, leaving 34 executives 
in the sample. 
2) In the Casino Industry 
 One executive was removed because the executive had a greater than 100% 
change in total cash compensation from 2005 to 2006, leaving 86 executives 
in the sample. 
3) In the Restaurant Industry 
 Fourteen executives were removed because they had a greater than 100% 
change in total cash compensation from 2005 to 2006, leaving 195 executives 
in the sample.  
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5.  After transforming the actual cash compensation of executives to their natural 
logarithms, two outliers were detected in the restaurant sample as having a very 
low log value. The real dollar amounts of two executives’ annual total cash 
compensations (outliers) were same as $25,000. The $25,000 for each executive’s 
total cash compensation was too small, compared with other executives in the 
sample. Thus, the two outliers were deleted from the restaurant sample to achieve 
more efficient results. As a result of removing the two outliers from the restaurant 
sample, the number of executives in the restaurant sample decreased from 195 to 
193, and the number of executives in the full sample decreased from 315 to 313. 
6. Finally, the sample was divided into two sub-samples: the hotel and casino 
industry made up one sub-sample and the restaurant industry made up the other. 
The hotel and casino companies were combined as one sub-sample because the 
number of executives in those industries was too small to conduct statistical 
analysis, especially regression analysis. Combining them made sense since hotel 
and casino companies are not always easily distinguished because some hotel 
companies also have casino facilities, and vice versa. 
 
As shown in Table 3-1, these procedures led to a total of 313 executives from 83 
hospitality companies: 120 executives from the 29 hotel and casino companies and 193 
executives from the 50 restaurant companies.  
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Table 3-1. Classification of study sample 
Category Type of Industry 
Number of 
companies 
Number of 
executives 
Sub-Sample Hotel & Casino Industry 29 120 
 Sub-Sample Restaurant Industry 50 193 
Full Sample  Hospitality Industry 79 313 
 
 
2. Variable selection 
 
Based on the extensive literature review, eleven variables were selected for the 
study—one dependent variable, six variables from the pay-for-performance rule, and four 
variables from the managerial power approach. The dependent variable (executive total 
cash compensation) and the six financial variables were transformed by natural logarithm 
or calculated by formula to conduct the multiple regression analyses for this study. This 
section explains why the dependent and independent variables were selected for the 
purposes of this study, how the dependent variable and one independent variable (firm 
size) were transformed, and how the other financial measures to be utilized for this study 
were calculated. 
 
Selection of dependent variable 
Executive compensation consists of three main types of executive compensation: 
cash-based compensation (e.g., salary and bonus), deferred compensation (e.g., stock 
options), and benefit-based compensation (e.g. insurance and pensions) (Brigham & 
Houston, 2001). As has been the case with many prior studies, the current study used 
only the cash-based compensation (in this case, salary and bonus for 2006) as the 
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dependent variable (Gray & Cannelaa, Jr., 1997; Gu & Choi, 2004; Jensen & Murphy, 
1990; Kim & Gu, 2005; Lippert & Porter, 1997). Other types of compensation were not 
included because they are difficult to translate into comparable (cash) amounts. In 
addition, total cash compensation was transformed by natural logarithm in order to avoid 
the statistical problem of heteroscedasticity that can result from the not equal variances of 
variables from raw data when conducting the regression analyses (Dyl, 1988; Ott & 
Longnecker, 2001). By adopting the base of natural logarithms for each executive’s total 
cash compensation, the dependent variable was transformed from the original values of 
executive total cash compensation to the log of executive total cash compensation.  
 
Selection of independent variables 
 
Firm performance variables 
Several types of financial measures for firm performance have been utilized in 
prior empirical executive compensation studies, primarily market-based performance 
measures, accounting-based performance measures, and growth-based performance 
measures. The current study adopted both accounting-based and growth-based 
performance measures.  Market-based performance measures (e.g., stock returns) were 
not chosen for this study because they can be easily biased by “noise” that is not 
controlled by management (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Firm size was also utilized 
as a financial variable. The financial measures for firm performance were adopted and 
modified from Gu and Choi’s study (2004) and Kim and Gu’s study (2005) in the 
hospitality field.  
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As was mentioned in the literature review, accounting-based financial 
performance measures are generally divided into four categories: liquidity, activity, 
profitability, and coverage. Current ratio and quick ratio are common examples of 
liquidity ratios, which estimate a firm’s ability to pay back its short-term debts. Current 
ratio (CR) was selected for this study, rather than quick ratio, because CR is most 
commonly used as a basic ratio for liquidity and because quick ratio excludes more liquid 
assets, like inventory, even though inventory is one of the most important assets in the 
hospitality industry (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2005). Activity ratios measure management’s 
effectiveness in employing its resources to the firm’s business and include mainly 
receivable turnover, inventory turnover, and asset turnover (Kieso et al., 2001). As in Gu 
and Choi (2004) and Kim and Gu (2005), asset turnover was selected for this study. 
Profitability ratios include return on assets, profit margin on sales, and earnings per share 
(EPS). Return on assets and EPS have often been used in executive compensation studies 
as an estimator of firm’s profitability (Duru & Iyengar, 1999; Eichholtz et al., 2008; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Perry & Zenner, 2001). EPS was selected as an estimator of 
firm’s profitability ratios for the current study, rather than return on assets, because EPS 
facilitates checking the firm’s profitability based on the amount of outstanding common 
stock, so EPS is an indicator of shareholder profits from the firm’s business activities in 
the fiscal year (Gallagher & Andrew, 1997). Finally, as has been the case in prior studies 
in the field, debt ratio (DT) (Kim & Gu, 2005; Ortiz-Molina, 2007) was selected as an 
estimator of the firm’s coverage ratios, which measure the firm’s ability to protect itself 
from its total debt (Brigham & Houston, 2001). 
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Most previous executive compensation studies have also added firm size and sales 
growth as financial determinants of executive compensation. Firm size has been used as a 
control variable in prior executive compensation studies because it is highly correlated 
with the level of executive compensation (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987). Thus, as in other 
studies, total assets (TA) was selected to estimate firm size for this study (Gu & Choi, 
2004; Kim & Gu, 2005). Sales growth has also been viewed as an indicator of growth-
based performance and was adopted from Kim and Gu’s study as a estimator of growth-
based performance for the current study. Thus, a total of six financial variables from the 
pay-for-performance rule were utilized for this study.  
Accounting-based financial ratios were used to transform and calculate six 
financial variables from the pay-for-performance rule into independent variables. Firm 
size and sales growth rate were also calculated using formulas; firm size transformed the 
dollar amount of the firm’s total assets by natural logarithms to avoid the bias of 
heteroscedasticity. The following formulas were used to calculate the financial variables 
for this study: 
 
1) 
sLiabilitieCurrent 
AssetsCurrent (CR) RatioCurrent =    
2) 
Assets Total
SalesNet (AT)Turnover Asset =  
3) goutstandinstock Common 
Paid DividendsStock   Preferred-IncomeNet 
=(EPS) Shareper  Earinings  
4) 
Assets Total
Debt Total(DT) RatioDebt =  
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5) 
2005
20052006
Sales
Sales - Sales (SG)Growth  Sales =  
6) )TotalAsset(Log=(FS) size Firm  
 
Managerial power variables 
Several types of variables have been utilized in prior studies to investigate the 
effects of the stock ownership structure and board independence on executive 
compensation. For this study, four variables from the managerial power approach were 
selected: Number of board directors (NDIR), Number of compensation committee 
members (NCCMT), Executive as current director (PDIR), and the executive’s stock 
ownership (SO). Several studies have adopted NDIR and NCCMT to estimate the board’s 
independence (Core et al., 1999; Firth et al., 2007; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Hallock, 
1997; Ozkan, 2007; Yermack, 1995). Real numbers for both variables were collected 
from the companies’ proxy statements (DEF 14A) in the SEC filing lists and recorded in 
the dataset. PDIR represents whether the executive is a current member of the board of 
directors and was a dummy variable, coded 0 if the executive was not a current board 
director or 1 otherwise. Finally, the executive’s stock ownership was included to examine 
the effect of ownership structure on executive compensation and was also a dummy 
variable, coded 0 if the executive has less than 5% of company’s common stocks or 1 
otherwise. The classification rule for this variable was based on whether the executive 
held more than 5% of the company’s outstanding common stocks. Since 1960s, numerous 
researchers have used the cut-off point of 5% stock ownership convention in many 
empirical research, because 5% of stock ownership for publicly traded company has been 
considered as enough amounts of stocks to influence on the firm’s decision making 
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(Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987). Thus, four variables 
from the managerial power approach were adopted and modified to examine the effects 
of corporate governance and stock ownership on executive compensation in the 
hospitality industry. 
 
 
3. Data Analysis and Model 
 
This research is designed as a cross-sectional data analysis to examine how each 
financial performance and managerial power variable is linked to executive cash 
compensation in the hospitality industry. The data analysis of this study consisted of a 
descriptive analysis, a reliability test, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
analysis, and a quantile regression analysis. A descriptive analysis summarized the 
sample’s financial characteristics (e.g., firm size, EPS, and sales) and corporate 
governance characteristics (e.g., number of board members, executive’s stock ownership, 
board characteristics). Several types of reliability tests were conducted to check the data 
before doing the OLS regression and quantile regression analyses. Scatter plots allowed 
outliers to be removed from the sample, and a histogram and normal probability plot 
tested the normality and linearity in order to check the assumptions of the multiple 
regression analysis.  
The OLS regression analysis and the quantile regression analysis were used to 
investigate the determinants of executive cash compensation, with total cash 
compensation as the dependent variable (Y) and all variables from both the pay-for-
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performance rule and the managerial power approach as the independent variables (X). 
Quantile regression analysis allowed examination of whether different levels of total cash 
compensation are related differently to each independent variable from the pay-for-
performance rule and the managerial power approach. 
To test the hypotheses proposed in literature review chapter, the multiple 
regression models for each industry were proposed as follows:  
 
Predicted Executive total cash compensation = β0+ β1 Current ratio(CR) it  + β2 Asset 
turnover(AT) it  + β3 Debt ratio(DT) it + β4 Firm size(FS) it + β5 Earnings per Share 
(EPS) it  + β6 Sales growth(SG) it  + β7 Executive as board directors(PDIR) it  + β8 
Number of board directors(NDIR) it +  β9 Number of compensation committee 
members(NCCMT) it  + β10 Executive’s stock shares (SO) it  + ε it , 
Where,  
 
 β0 = the intercept; β1,2…,10 = the beta coefficient or slope; and εit = the random error term 
or the residual portion; Total cash compensation it = the sum of executive’s annual cash 
salary and cash bonus for firm i in year t; Current ratio it = Current asset/Current liabilities 
for firm i in year t; Asset turnover it = Total sale (revenue)/ Average of asset for firm i in 
year t; Debt ratio it =Total liabilities / Total assets for firm i in year t; Firm size it = Log of 
the book value of total assets of firm i in year t ; Earnings per Share it = (Net income – 
preferred common stock dividend paid) / common stock outstanding for firm i in year t; 
Sales growth it = the percentage growth in sales for firm i from year t-1 to year t; 
Executive as board director it = Whether the executive is also a member of the board for 
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firm i in year t (not current member of board = 0, current member of board = 1); Number 
of board directors it = Total number of board directors for firm i in year t; Number of 
compensation committee members it  = Number of compensation committee members for 
firm i in year t; and Executive’s stock shares it = whether the portion of executive’s equity 
shares for firm i in year t is more than 5% of the firm’s outstanding common stock (less 
than 5% = 0, more than 5% = 1). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 
1. Description of Sample 
 
Table 4-1 shows a frequency analysis for the characteristics of this study’s 
sample. Executive total cash compensation in the hospitality industry averages $559,484, 
range from $109,490 to $3,035,000. The average executive total cash compensation in 
hotel and casino companies is higher than that in restaurant companies, at $711,395 and 
$465,031, respectively; the median in hotel and casino companies is also larger than the 
median in restaurant companies. Furthermore, the mean of the percent change of 
executive compensation from 2005 to 2006 was negative at -8.95%, but the average 
percent change and the median percent change of executive total cash compensation in 
hotel and casino companies was more negative than was that for restaurants  (-14.98% 
and -5.20% average change, respectively; and -12.44% and -2.6% median change, 
respectively).
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Table 4-1. Descriptive Statistics of Executive Total Cash Compensation (N=313) 
Sample Category Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
Total Cash 
Compensation  
(2006) 
$559,484 $483,339 $388,600 $109,490 $3,035,000 
All 
Hospitality 
Companies 
(N=313) 
% Change of 
Total Cash 
Compensation 
(2005 - 2006) 
-8.95 32.08 -5.74 -85.08 96.04 
Total Cash 
Compensation  
(2006) 
$711,395 $587,548 $564,879 $109,490 $2,825,000 
Hotel & 
Casino 
Companies 
(N=120) 
% Change of 
Total Cash 
Compensation 
(2005 - 2006) 
-14.98 35.09 -12.44 -85.08 50.95 
Total Cash 
Compensation  
(2006) 
$465,031 $398,081 $339,984 $112,452 $3,035,000 
Restaurant 
Companies 
(N=193) % Change of Total Cash 
Compensation 
(2005 - 2006) 
-5.20 29.53 -2.60 -71.27 96.04 
 
In terms of corporate governance characteristics, the average number of board 
members is 8 for both the full sample (all hospitality industry) and the sub-samples 
(Hotel & Casino industry and Restaurant industry), and the number of board members 
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ranges from 3 to 14. More than 30% of executives in the samples are board members and 
more than 30% of the executives in the samples also hold more than 5% of outstanding 
stock, which indicates that many have enough power to influence board decisions. 
Prior to performing OLS regression and quantile regression analysis, several tests 
for outliers, normality, and linearity were performed to check assumptions of the multiple 
regression method. The outliers were checked by developing scatter plots of samples; 
there were no outliers among dependent variables (Log TCC) in the full sample or the 
sub-samples (Figures 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3).  
 
Figure 4-1.  Scatter plot for full sample (All hospitality industry) 
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Figure 4-2.  Scatter plot for sub-sample (Hotel & Casino industry) 
 
 
Figure 4-3.  Scatter plot for sub-sample (Restaurant industry) 
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The normality and linearity of samples were also tested using histograms and 
normal probability plots of standardized residuals for dependent variables (Log of total 
cash compensation). As shown in Figure 4-4, standardized residuals of dependent 
variables in the full sample were normally distributed and had linearity. Figures 4-5 and 
4-6 also show that non-normality and nonlinearity were not detected in the sub-samples 
of either the Hotel & Casino sub-sample or the Restaurant sub-sample. Thus, it was 
confirmed that data sets of both the full sample and the sub-samples were appropriate to 
conduct multiple regression methods to examine the relationship between executive total 
cash compensation and independent variables selected for this study. 
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Figure 4-4.  Histogram and Normal P-P Plot for full sample (All hospitality industry) 
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Figure 4-5.  Histogram and Normal P-P Plot for sub-sample (Hotel & Casino industry) 
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Figure 4-6.  Histogram and Normal P-P Plot for sub-sample (Restaurant industry) 
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2. Findings of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression 
 
Tables 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 report the results of the OLS regression with the full sample 
and the two sub-samples. Multicollinearity for the three multiple regression models had 
to be checked since high correlations among the variables would cause deviation or 
and/or misleading results in the multiple regression statistics by changing input variable 
in the regression model as variables were added in or deleted from the model (Pedhazur, 
1997). The variance inflation factor (VIF) was used to check the impact of 
multicollinearity between each independent variable in the regression models. The higher 
the VIF number, the greater the impact of collinearity on the accuracy of the model (Ott 
& Longneker, 2001).  
The VIF values shown in Table 4-2, for the full sample, lie in the range between 
1.091 and 3.361. This does not indicate a serious multicollinearity problem because the 
VIF is well below the problematic level of 10 (Ott & Longneker, 2001). The range of VIF 
values for the Hotel & Casino sub-sample are between 1.088 and 5.141 (Table 4-3), and 
Table 4-4 shows that the VIF values of the Restaurant sub-sample are between 1.275 and 
2.906. Thus, there are no serious multicollinearity problems for the sub-samples either.  
After testing multicollinearity using VIF values, OLS regression analyses were 
conducted to investigate the relationship between the dependent variable and 10 
independent variables to examine the three main hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3). The 
dependent variable for the OLS regression models is the log of executive total cash 
compensation and the ten independent variables consisted of six financial variables and 
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four managerial power variables. The results of the OLS regression analyses are 
presented in Tables 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4.  
 
Results of OLS regression method for the Full sample 
Table 4-2 summarizes the results of the OLS regression for the full sample with 
six financial variables and four managerial power variables. Both the R-square (=0.646) 
and the adjusted R-square (=0.634) for this model were the appropriate level of goodness 
of fit for empirical study in social science fields. 
The p-values of three of the financial variables (DT, FS, EPS) were less than 0.01 
with positive coefficients, and the p-values of the other three financial variables (CR, AT, 
GS) were larger than 0.05, so only DT, FS, and EPS were positively related to the 
dependent variable at a statistically significant level of 0.01. The p-values of both PDIR 
and SO were less than 0.01, and PDIR and SO were positively associated with executive 
total cash compensation at a p-value of 0.01. 
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Table 4-2. OLS regression summary for the Full sample (all hospitality companies) 
 
 
Variable 
 
T Value 
 
Significance 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
Regression 
Coefficients 
  Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 4.672   56.480 0.000   
CR 0.021 1.239 0.216 0.713 1.403 
AT 0.022 1.125 0.262 0.505 1.982 
DT 0.115 3.419       0.001*** 0.788 1.269 
FS 0.245   10.186       0.000*** 0.298 3.361 
EPS 0.038 4.170       0.000*** 0.615 1.626 
GS 0.079 1.739   0.083* 0.917 1.091 
PDIR 0.182 6.749       0.000*** 0.658 1.520 
NDIR 0.010 1.583 0.114 0.514 1.946 
NCCMT -0.004 -0.494 0.622 0.844 1.185 
SO 0.092 3.196       0.002*** 0.578 1.730 
N 
R-Square 
Adjusted R 
313 
0.646 
0.634 
 
Note: * P< 0.10, ** P< 0.05, ***P<0.01 
 
After the OLS regression analysis, the following model was accepted with 
statistical significance: 
 
Predicted Executive total cash compensation = 4.672 + 0.115 Debt to asset ratio(DT) + 
0.245 Firm size(FS) + 0.038 Earnings per share(EPS) + 0.182 Type of board 
directors(PDIR) + 0.092 Executive’s stock shares(SO). 
 
Thus, hypotheses H1-3, H1-4, H1-5, H1-7, and H1-10 were accepted at the 0.01 
level, but hypotheses H1-1, H1-2, H1-6, H1-8, and H1-9 were not.  
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Results of OLS regression method for the Hotel & Casino sub-sample 
Table 4-3 summarizes the results of the OLS regression method for the Hotel & 
Casino sub-sample with six financial variables and four managerial power variables. Both 
the R-square (=0.708) and the adjusted R-square (=0.682) for this model were the 
appropriate level of goodness of fit.  
Like the OLS regression for the full sample, six financial variables were used for 
the OLS regression for this sub-sample with the result that the p-values for four variables 
(DT, FS, EPS, and GS) were less than 0.01, and the p-values of CR and AT were larger 
than 0.05. Thus, DT, FS, EPS, and GS were positively associated with the dependent 
variable with statistical significance at the 0.01 level. The p-values of only two 
managerial power variables, PDIR and SO, were less than 0.05, so PDIR and SO were 
positively related with the executive total cash compensation at a p-value of 0.05. 
 
Table 4-3. OLS regression summary for the Hotel & Casino sub-sample 
 
 
Variable 
 
T Value 
 
Significance Collinearity Statistics 
 
Regression 
Coefficients 
  Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 4.507 28.246 0.000   
CR 0.051 1.373 0.173 0.532 1.881 
AT        -0.034  -0.954 0.342 0.819 1.222 
DT 0.176 2.797    0.006*** 0.646 1.547 
FS 0.307 5.780    0.000*** 0.195 5.141 
EPS 0.041 3.250    0.002*** 0.479 2.088 
GS 0.141 2.662    0.009*** 0.919 1.088 
PDIR 0.207 4.813    0.000*** 0.731 1.369 
NDIR        -0.002   -0.153 0.878 0.388 2.576 
NCCMT        -0.008   -0.413 0.680 0.630 1.587 
SO 0.106 2.264   0.026** 0.638 1.568 
N 
R-Square 
Adjusted R 
120 
0.708 
0.682 
 
Note: * P< 0.10, ** P< 0.05, *** P<0.01 
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After the OLS regression analysis, the following model was accepted with 
statistical significance: 
 
Predicted Executive total cash compensation = 4.507 + 0.176 Debt to asset ratio(DT) + 
0.307 Firm size(FS) + 0.041 Earnings per share(EPS) + 0.141 Sales growth(GS) + 0.207 
Type of board directors(PDIR) + 0.106 Executive’s stock shares(SO).  
 
Thus, hypotheses H2-3, H2-4, H2-5, H2-6, H2-7, and H2-10 were accepted at 
0.05 level, while hypotheses H2-1, H2-2, H2-8, and H2-9 were not. 
 
Results of OLS regression for the Restaurant sub-sample 
Table 4-4 summarizes the results of the OLS regression for the Restaurant sub-
sample. Both the R-square (=0.591) and the adjusted R-square (=0.598) for this model 
had the appropriate level of goodness of fit, even though both were less than those for the 
full sample or the other sub-sample. 
Contrary to the results of the OLS regression analyses for the full sample and the 
Hotel & Casino sub-sample, the results of the OLS regression for the Restaurant sub-
sample had only two variables (DT and FS) in the financial variables with p-values less 
than 0.05 and positive coefficients, indicating that DT and FS were positively related to 
the dependent variable at a statistically significant level of 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
The results of the Restaurant sub-sample were similar to those of the full sample and the 
Hotel & Casino sub-sample in terms of the managerial power variables, as the p-values of 
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both PDIR and SO were less than 0.05. Thus, PDIR and SO were positively associated 
with executive total cash compensation at a p-value at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 4-4. OLS regression summary for the Restaurant sub-sample 
 
 
Variable 
 
T Value 
 
Significance. Collinearity Statistics 
 
Regression 
Coefficients 
  Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 4.715  42.041 0.000   
CR 0.028 1.433 0.154 0.715 1.398 
AT 0.023 0.850 0.396 0.649 1.542 
DT 0.093 2.058   0.041** 0.784 1.275 
FS 0.255 8.279    0.000*** 0.344 2.906 
EPS 0.011 0.594 0.553 0.536 1.865 
GS     -0.127 -1.183 0.238 0.781 1.280 
PDIR 0.161 4.676    0.000*** 0.594 1.683 
NDIR 0.012 1.421 0.157 0.471 2.124 
NCCMT -0.010 -0.927 0.355 0.764 1.310 
SO 0.090 2.490   0.014** 0.526 1.900 
N 
R-Square 
Adjusted R 
193 
0.591 
0.568 
 
Note: * P< .10, ** P< .05, P<0.01 
 
After the OLS regression analysis, the following model was accepted with 
statistical significance:  
 
Predicted Executive total cash compensation = 4.715 + 0.093 Debt ratio(DT) + 0.255 
Firm size (FS) + 0.161 Type of board directors(PDIR) + 0.090 Executive’s stock 
shares(SO).  
 
Thus, only hypotheses H3-3, H3-4, H3-7, and H3-10 were accepted at 0.05 level, 
but hypotheses H3-1, H3-2, H3-5, H3-6, H3-8, and H3-9 were not accepted. 
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3. Findings of the Quantile Regression  
 
After conducting the OLS regression analyses, the quantile regression analyses 
were conducted to test the three proposed hypotheses under the second main hypotheses 
(H3, H4, and H5) to determine whether the selected independent variables are differently 
related to different levels of executive compensation. The variables for the quantile 
regression were the same as the variables in the OLS regression analyses. There are two 
usual ways of interpreting the results of quantile regression: checking the statistical 
significance of the coefficients of each independent variable toward dependent variable, 
and checking the pattern of coefficients of each independent variable toward each 
quantile of the dependent variables. Tables 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7 show the results of the 
quantile regression analysis for the coefficient estimates of the model for the full sample 
and the two sub-samples, and Figures 4-7, 4-8, and 4-9 show the pattern of the 
coefficients of each independent variable from the pay-for-performance rule and the 
managerial power approaches toward each quantile of dependent variable (the level of 
executive total cash compensation) for the three samples.  The X-axis for each graph 
shows the quantile of executive total cash compensation, and the Y-axis shows the 
coefficients of the independent variables from both the pay-for-performance rule and the 
managerial power approach. Red lines show the coefficients for the independent variables 
from the OLS regression analysis, and the black line represents the coefficients of the 
independent variable from the quantile regression analysis. The black shadow areas show 
the 95% confidence interval of coefficients for the independent variables from the results 
of the quantile regression analysis.  
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Results of the quantile regression method for the Full sample 
Table 4-5 shows the results of the quantile regression analysis for the coefficient 
estimates of the model with the full sample of the hospitality industry. Generally 
speaking, it looks similar to the OLS regression results for the full sample, even though 
the quantile regression provides more specific results than the OLS regression does. 
For example, for the financial variables, neither CR nor AT were correlated with 
executive total cash compensation at an alpha level of 0.05 in the OLS regression, but the 
quantile regression showed that both CR and AT were significantly related to executive 
total cash compensation at the 0.05 level for the low quantiles of compensation, the 0.1-
0.2 and the 0.1-0.3 quantiles, respectively. Thus, executives who received lower cash 
compensation were influenced by CR and AT, while others were not. In addition, the 
coefficient graphs for both CR and AT (Figure 4-7) show that the coefficient values for 
CR and AT decreased as the level of executive compensation increased, indicating that 
executives at a lower level of compensation were more sensitive to both CR and AT than 
were the executives in the middle and upper level of compensation. For the DT and FS 
variables, the quantile regression analysis provided results similar to those of the OLS 
regression analysis (i.e., both DT and FS were significantly related to executive 
compensation in the full sample with statistical significance at an alpha level of 0.05). 
However, the coefficient graphs for DT show moderate volatility of coefficients from the 
lower quantile to the upper quantile of executive compensation. This indicates that DT 
was not differently related to the level of executive compensation with statistical 
significance. In contrast to the DT graph, the pattern of coefficients of the FS variable 
decreased from the lower quantile of executive compensation to the middle quantile, then 
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increased as it approached the upper quantile. Thus, the low and high levels of executive 
compensation were more related to firm size than was the middle range of executive 
compensation.  
 The results of the quantile regression also show that EPS was not significantly 
correlated with executive total cash compensation for executives in the lower level of 
compensation, the 0.1-0.3 quantile, at an alpha level of 0.05, even though EPS was 
significantly correlated with total cash compensation in the OLS regression results. This 
suggests that EPS affects only the executives in the mid- and upper levels of total cash 
compensation. The coefficient graph for the EPS variable in Figures 4-7 shows an 
increasing pattern for the coefficient value of EPS from the lower to the upper quantiles 
of executive compensation, so executives with lower compensation were less sensitive to 
EPS than were executives in the middle and upper levels of compensation.  
The result from the quantile regression also shows that GS was significantly 
correlated with executive total cash compensation for executives in the mid- and upper 
levels of total cash compensation (0.5-0.8 quantile) at an alpha level of 0.05, even though 
GS was not significantly related with executive’s total cash compensation in the OLS 
regression results. The coefficient graph for the GS variable (Figures 4-7) shows the 
coefficient value for GS increasing as the level of executive compensation increases, so 
executives with lower compensation were less sensitive to GS than were executives in the 
middle and upper levels of compensation.  
The result of the quantile regression analysis of the four managerial power 
variables was not much different from that of the OLS regression. Both PDIR and SO 
were significantly correlated with executive total cash compensation at the 0.05 level, and 
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NDIR and NCCMT were not. Figure 4-7shows that the only pattern of the SO coefficient 
of SO was an increasing pattern from the low quantile to the high quantile of executive 
total cash compensation. By contrast, the pattern of PDIR coefficient had moderate 
variation. Thus, the effect of SO on executive compensation increased as executive 
compensation increased.  
From the results of the quantile regression analysis, hypotheses: H4-1, H4-2, H4-
4, H4-5, H4-6 and H4-10 were accepted at 0.05 level, while hypotheses: H4-3, H4-7, H4-
8, and H4-9 were not accepted. 
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Table 4-5. Quantile regression summary for the Full sample (all hospitality industry) 
 
Quantile Regression(%) Variables   
  
     10      20      30      40      50      60      70      80      90 
  4.328   4.481   4.580   4.687   4.711   4.858   4.789   4.787   4.813 (Intercept) 
  
Coefficient 
T value 40.872*** 44.184*** 42.525*** 40.364*** 38.154*** 38.339*** 33.963*** 28.451*** 25.382*** 
  0.066   0.044   0.026   0.015   0.012 -0.009 -0.004   0.002   0.016 CR Coefficient 
T value 
  3.316***   2.317**   1.333   0.686   0.529 -0.396 -0.169   0.071   0.417 
  0.063   0.053   0.050   0.033   0.040   0.000   0.001   0.017 -0.006 AT Coefficient 
T value 
  2.495**   2.121**   1.964**   1.248   1.449 -0.014   0.020   0.520 -0.159 
  0.159   0.099   0.094   0.092   0.085   0.117   0.100   0.080   0.070 DT Coefficient 
T value 
  4.039***   2.776***   2.607***   2.426**   2.249**   3.238***   2.583***   2.085**   1.538 
  0.260   0.276   0.251   0.232   0.231   0.192   0.233   0.274   0.277 FS Coefficient 
T value 
  7.527***   8.569***   7.489***   6.759***   6.518***   5.696***   6.164***   6.197***   5.491*** 
  0.021   0.017   0.018   0.036   0.038   0.065   0.053   0.054   0.047 EPS Coefficient 
T value 
  1.409   1.297   1.311   2.324**   2.349**   4.268***   3.571***   3.667***   2.937*** 
-0.010   0.012   0.065   0.137   0.168   0.183   0.170   0.140   0.071 GS Coefficient 
T value -0.137   0.169   0.876   1.755*   2.119**   2.561**   2.356**   1.943**   1.059 
  0.210   0.175   0.192   0.165   0.180   0.188   0.166   0.177   0.213 PDIR Coefficient 
T value 
  5.090***   4.901***   5.139***   4.207***   4.497***   4.922***   4.298***   4.348***   4.490*** 
  0.002 -0.001   0.005   0.006   0.006   0.016   0.019   0.002   0.014 NDIR Coefficient 
T value 
  0.172 -0.163   0.615   0.659   0.635   1.758*   2.111**   0.246   1.185 
  0.019   0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.012 -0.018 -0.001 -0.011 NCCMT Coefficient 
T value 
  1.770*   0.522 -0.082 -0.195 -0.075 -1.038 -1.494 -0.120 -0.864 
  0.017   0.105   0.083   0.090   0.066   0.078   0.106   0.140   0.142 SO Coefficient 
T value 
  0.351   2.870***   2.182**   2.276**   1.631   1.981**   2.610***   3.309***   3.085*** 
Sample Size 
  N=313   N=313 N=313  N=313   N=313   N=313   N=313   N=313   N=313 
Note: * P< .10, ** P< .05, P<0.01 
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Figure 4-7.  The coefficient graphs of all hospitality industry by Quantile regression 
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Results of quantile regression method for Hotel & Casino sub-sample 
Table 4-6 shows the result of the quantile regression analysis for the coefficient 
estimates of the model with the Hotel & Casino sub-sample. Generally speaking, the 
results of the quantile regression analysis were similar to those of the OLS regression 
results for the sub-sample, but the quantile regression provides more specific results than 
the OLS regression. 
For example, neither CR nor AT in the quantile regression results were correlated 
with executive total cash compensation in the hotel and restaurant industry at an alpha 
level of 0.05, which is the same as the results from the OLS regression. However, the 
patterns of the coefficients of both the CR and AT variables (Figure 4-8) provided 
meaningful results, even though the CR and AT were not significantly related with the 
level of executive compensation. The patterns of the coefficient value for both CR and 
AT decreased as the level of executive compensation increased, indicating that the 
executives at lower levels of compensation were more sensitive toward both CR and AT 
than were the executives at middle and upper levels of compensation.  
In addition, DT was not significantly related to all quantile of executive 
compensation in the result from the quantile regression, while the OLS regression 
showed that DT is significantly related to executive compensation. The quantile 
regression provided, however, that DT was significantly related to compensation for the 
low quantile, 0.1-0.2 quantile, so only those executives at the low level of total cash 
compensation were influenced by DT. In addition, the coefficient graphs for the DT 
variable (Figure 4-8) show that the pattern of the coefficient value for DT decreased 
slightly as the level of executive compensation increased, suggesting that executives at 
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lower levels of compensation were slightly more sensitive to DT than were the executives 
in the middle and upper levels of compensation.  
The quantile regression analysis provided similar results for the FS variable as the 
OLS regression results for this sub-sample that FS was statistically significantly related to 
executive compensation at an alpha level of 0.05. However, the pattern of coefficients of 
the FS variable decreased from the lower quantile of executive compensation to the 
middle quantile, then increased to the upper quantile. This suggests that the low and high 
levels of executive compensation were more related to firm size than was the middle 
range of executive compensation.  
 The results of the quantile regression show that EPS was not significantly 
correlated with executive total cash compensation for the low quantile (0.1 – 03 quantile) 
of executive compensation, even though EPS was significantly correlated with executive 
total cash compensation in the OLS regression results. It implies that EPS significantly 
affects only the executive in mid- and upper level of total cash compensation. 
Furthermore, the coefficient graphs for the EPS variable (Figure 4-8) show that the 
coefficient value for EPS increased from the lower quantile of executive compensation to 
the upper quantile, so executives at the lower level of compensation were less sensitive to 
EPS than were executives in middle and upper levels of compensation. The quantile 
regression also shows that GS was significantly correlated with executive total cash 
compensation, but only for the upper level of compensation (0.8 -0.9 quantile), even 
though GS was significantly related to compensation in the OLS regression results. Thus, 
GS affected only the executives at the upper level of total cash compensation. In addition, 
the coefficient graphs for the GS variable (Figure 4-8) show that the coefficient value for 
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GS increased as the level of executive compensation increased, which also supports the 
conclusion that those at the lower level of compensation were less sensitive toward GS 
than were those at the middle and upper levels.  
The result of the quantile regression analysis was not much different for the four 
managerial power variables than the results of the OLS regression. PDIR was 
significantly correlated with executive total cash compensation at the 0.05 level, whereas 
NDIR and NCCMT were not. Most notable were the results from the quantile regression 
for the SO variable, which showed that SO was significantly correlated with executive 
total cash compensation for executives only at the upper level of total cash compensation 
(0.7-0.8 quantile) at an alpha level of 0.05, even though SO was significantly related to 
executive total cash compensation in the OLS regression results. Of the two statistically 
significant variables (PDIR and SO) shown in Figure 4-8, only SO had a pattern of 
coefficients that increased from the low quantile to the high quantile of executive total 
cash compensation; the pattern of coefficients for PDIR had moderate volatility. It 
indicates that executives at the lower level of compensation were less sensitive to SO 
than were executives in middle and upper levels of compensation. 
After the quantile regression analysis, only hypotheses H5-3, H5-4, H5-5, H5-6, 
and H5-10 were accepted at 0.05 level, while hypotheses H5-1, H5-2, H5-7, H5-8, and 
H5-9 were not. 
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Table 4-6. Quantile regression summary for the Hotel & Casino sub-sample 
 Quantile Regression(%) Variables 
        10      20      30      40      50      60      70      80      90 
Coefficient     4.060   4.100   4.296   4.616   4.776   4.794   4.803   4.772   4.957 (Intercept) 
T value   12.676*** 12.883*** 15.616*** 18.646*** 17.778*** 19.584*** 20.668*** 18.487*** 17.351*** 
Coefficient     0.117   0.125   0.070   0.013  -0.012  -0.014  -0.029  -0.031  -0.024 CR 
T value     1.651   1.692*   1.077   0.208  -0.188  -0.254  -0.571  -0.588  -0.417 
Coefficient    -0.043   0.053   0.014  -0.055  -0.055  -0.067  -0.051  -0.025  -0.059 AT 
T value    -0.560   0.924   0.258  -0.988  -0.985  -1.382  -1.069  -0.488  -1.137 
Coefficient     0.211   0.210   0.140   0.115   0.101   0.105   0.048   0.061   0.315 DT 
T value  2.264** 2.119**   1.538   1.219   1.030   1.236   0.618   0.726   1.351 
Coefficient     0.384   0.326   0.294   0.242   0.259   0.280   0.306   0.335   0.288 FS 
T value    3.148***  3.092***   3.308***  3.027***  3.337***  4.240***  4.845***  5.164***  4.280*** 
Coefficient     0.000   0.013   0.023   0.045   0.057   0.073   0.066   0.061   0.054 EPS 
T value     0.016   0.598   1.173 2.154**  2.569***  3.728***  3.575***  3.221***  2.679*** 
Coefficient     0.004   0.074   0.154   0.105   0.169   0.162   0.138   0.227   0.279 GS 
T value     0.038   0.627   1.378   0.986   1.617   1.666*   1.524 2.236**  2.651*** 
Coefficient     0.200   0.223   0.180   0.184   0.206   0.177   0.179   0.182   0.210 PDIR 
T value     2.782***  3.085*** 2.522**  2.454***  2.733***  2.773***  2.827***  2.766***  3.599*** 
Coefficient     0.013   0.008   0.014   0.015   0.004   0.002   0.005  -0.006  -0.007 NDIR 
T value     0.596   0.359   0.662   0.746   0.218   0.143   0.329  -0.385  -0.376 
Coefficient    -0.057  -0.009   0.002 -0.002  -0.020  -0.028  -0.036  -0.027  -0.043 NCCMT 
T value    -1.159  -0.276   0.058 -0.092  -0.721  -1.219  -1.716*  -1.022  -1.251 
Coefficient     0.023   0.038   0.070   0.123   0.120   0.120   0.130   0.168   0.061 SO 
T value     0.254   0.444   0.852   1.544   1.566   1.900* 2.045** 2.461**   1.001 
Sample Size 
   N=120   N=120   N=120  N=120   N=120   N=120   N=120   N=120   N=120 
Note: * P< .10, ** P< .05, P<0.01 
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Figure 4-8.  The coefficient graphs of the Hotel & Casino sub-sample by quantile 
regression 
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Results of quantile regression for the Restaurant sub-sample 
Table 4-7 shows the results of the quantile regression analysis for the coefficient 
estimates of the model with the Restaurant sub-sample. The quantile regression provided 
more specific results than the OLS regression for restaurant sub-sample, even though the 
result of the quantile regression analysis for the restaurant sub-sample was similar to that 
of the OLS regression results in this sub-sample.  
In the quantile regression, unlike the results from the OLS regression, both CR 
and AT were correlated with executive total cash compensation at the lower quantile (0.1 
- 0.3 quantile) of executive compensation at the alpha level of 0.05. In addition, the 
coefficient graphs for both CR and AT (Figure 4-9) show that their coefficient values 
decreased as the level of executive compensation increased. This suggests that executives 
at lower levels of compensation were more sensitive to both CR and AT than were 
executives at the middle and upper levels of compensation.  
The result of the quantile regression also showed that DT was not significantly 
related to executive compensation, while the result from the OLS regression showed the 
opposite. In addition, the coefficient graphs for the DT variable (Figure 4-9) show that 
the pattern of the coefficient value for DT was one of moderate volatility from the lower 
quantile to the upper quantile of executive compensation. It indicates that there is no 
different impact of DT on different level of executive compensation in Restaurant 
industry. 
The quantile regression analysis provided similar results for the FS variable as 
that of the OLS regression that FS was statistically significantly related to executive 
compensation at an alpha level of 0.05. However, the pattern of coefficients of the FS 
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variable decreased from the lower quantile of executive compensation to the middle 
quantile, then increased in the upper quantile. Thus, the low and high levels of executive 
compensation were more related with firm size than was the middle range.  
The results of the quantile regression also showed that EPS was not significantly 
correlated with executive total cash compensation for any quantile of executive 
compensation at an alpha level of 0.05, which was the same as the result from the OLS 
regression. However, the coefficient graphs for the EPS variable in Figure 4-9 show that 
the coefficient value for EPS increased from the lower quantile of executive 
compensation to the upper quantile, indicating that the executives at the lower level of 
compensation were less sensitive to EPS than were the executives at the middle and 
upper levels.  
Like the OLS regression result, the quantile regression also shows that the GS 
variable was not significantly correlated with executive total cash compensation for any 
level of executive total cash compensation at an alpha level of 0.05. In addition, the 
coefficient graphs for the GS variable (Figure 4-9) show moderate volatility of the 
coefficient from the lower quantile to the upper quantile of executive compensation. Thus, 
GS was not related to the level of executive compensation. 
 The results of the quantile regression analysis for the four managerial power 
variables were not much different from those of the OLS regression. PDIR was 
significantly correlated with executive total cash compensation at the 0.05 level, while 
NDIR and NCCMT were not. However, the quantile regression for SO shows that SO 
was significantly correlated with executive total cash compensation only for executives at 
the upper level of compensation (0.7-0.9 quantile) at an 0.05 alpha level, while the OLS 
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regression shows that it was significantly related to executive total cash compensation in 
general.  
The coefficient pattern of SO (Figure 4-9) increased from the low quantile to the 
high quantile of compensation, suggesting that the effect of SO on executive 
compensation increase when the level of compensation increases. However, the pattern of 
coefficients for PDIR had moderate volatility, suggesting that there is no different effect 
of PDIR on different level of executive compensation.  
Furthermore, the pattern of the NDIR coefficient increased from the lower 
quantile to the upper quantile, which indicates that the executives at a lower level of 
compensation were less sensitive toward NDIR than were the executives at the middle 
and upper levels of compensation. However, the pattern of the NCCMT coefficient 
decreased from the lower quantile to the upper quantile, indicating that the executives at a 
lower level of compensation were more sensitive to NCCMT than were the executives at 
the middle and upper levels of compensation. After the quantile regression analysis, 
hypotheses H6-1, H6-2, H6-4, and H6-7 were accepted at 0.05 level, but H6-3, H6-5, H6-
6, H6-8, H6-9, and H6-10 were not accepted at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 4-7. Quantile regression summary for the Restaurant sub-sample 
 
  Quantile Regression(%) Variables 
         10      20      30      40      50      60      70      80      90 
Coefficient     4.465   4.504   4.488   4.614   4.662   4.846   4.841   4.884   4.999 (Intercept) 
T value  26.656*** 25.263*** 23.571*** 22.672*** 22.499*** 21.782*** 21.022*** 23.965*** 36.805*** 
Coefficient     0.061   0.050   0.053   0.025   0.017   0.017   0.024   0.009  -0.029 CR 
T value    2.662***   2.012**   2.004**   0.901   0.585   0.611   0.874   0.307  -1.017 
Coefficient     0.097   0.093   0.097   0.060   0.053   0.001  -0.001  -0.008  -0.072 AT 
T value  2.262**   2.109**   2.106**   1.299   1.155   0.015  -0.033  -0.199 -2.282*** 
Coefficient     0.030   0.037   0.059    0.058   0.066   0.070   0.053   0.077   0.094 DT 
T value     0.594   0.678   1.084   1.069   1.230   1.410   1.116   1.548   1.921 
Coefficient     0.275   0.280   0.289   0.272   0.273   0.234   0.255   0.248   0.203 FS 
T value    5.345***  5.336***  5.107***   4.744***  4.744***  4.080***  4.364***  4.720*** 5.258** 
Coefficient    -0.016   0.017   0.007   0.011   0.016   0.016   0.019   0.043   0.058 EPS 
T value    -0.605   0.578   0.242   0.368   0.522   0.527   0.676   1.536 2.295** 
Coefficient    -0.108  -0.124  -0.040  -0.037   0.046  -0.172  -0.248  -0.306  -0.220 GS 
T value    -1.023  -1.032  -0.315  -0.262   0.301  -1.000  -1.508  -1.819*  -1.133 
Coefficient     0.127   0.160   0.167   0.159   0.190   0.181   0.153   0.220   0.162 PDIR 
T value    2.827***  3.510***  3.441***  3.080***  3.731***  3.371***   2.888***  4.101*** 3.052*** 
Coefficient   -0.004  -0.008  -0.002   0.005   0.003   0.012   0.012   0.015   0.042 NDIR 
T value   -0.292  -0.689  -0.170   0.356   0.232   0.882   0.905   1.087 3.033*** 
Coefficient     0.002   0.006  -0.005  -0.007  -0.007  -0.009  -0.012  -0.017  -0.020 NCCMT 
T value     0.144   0.383  -0.265  -0.420  -0.402  -0.586  -0.766  -1.197  -1.556 
Coefficient     0.055   0.089   0.077   0.080   0.048   0.067   0.098   0.113   0.158 SO 
T value     1.169   1.916*   1.568   1.541   0.941   1.335 1.983** 2.221** 2.922** 
Sample Size 
   N=193   N=193  N=193   N=193   N=193   N=193   N=193   N=193   N=193 
Note: * P< .10, ** P< .05, P<0.01
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Figure 4-9.  The coefficient graphs of the Restaurant sub-sample by Quantile regression 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
1. Summary of the study 
 
This study has investigated the determinants of executive compensation in the 
hospitality industry with selected variables from both the pay-for-performance rule and 
the managerial power approach, using two multiple regression analysis methods: OLS 
regression and quantile regression. The study provides an empirical illustration of 
determinants of executive compensation in the hospitality industry as a whole, and in two 
sub-categories, the Hotel & Casino category and the Restaurant category. OLS regression 
analysis was performed first to identify the determinants of executive compensation in 
the hospitality industry on the basis of both the pay-for-performance rule and the 
managerial power approach. At the second stage of analysis, quantile regression analysis 
was adopted to examine whether the independent variables were differently related to 
different levels of executive compensation in the hospitality industry. A summary and 
discussion of the empirical findings of this study are presented in the following sections.
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Summary of the Full Sample: The Hospitality Industry 
 
OLS regression analysis 
The results of OLS regression analysis for the hospitality industry revealed that 
three financial variables, DT, FS, and EPS, and two managerial power variables, PDIR 
and SO, were positively related to executive compensation with statistical significance. 
Thus, pay-for-performance rules and managerial power variables both influenced 
executive compensation in the hospitality industry.   
While the financial variables suggested that firm size (FS) and firm profitability 
(EPS) positively affected executive compensation, the study found a different result from 
prior studies of executive compensation in the hospitality industry by showing that 
coverage ratio was positively related to executive compensation and that CR, AT, and GS 
were not. The results of the coverage ratio analysis revealed that executives in the 
hospitality industry were paid highly despite increasing risk to the firm. In general, a 
company with a higher debt ratio has a riskier financial status because high debt means a 
heavy interest burden and the need to repay principal (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2005) 
However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that agents (executives) in companies 
with high debt capital structures receive more compensation because of the incentive 
effects associated with debt: The agent is paid more for being willing to take on the 
challenge of activities which offer the possibility of very high payoffs, even when they 
have a very low probability of success. Such activities invoke an agency problem because 
the shareholders prefer that the company does not remain in a risky environment, but 
executives may prefer to invest in more risky projects in order to receive higher 
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compensation from big successes with risky projects. This result implies that there may 
be an agency problem in the hospitality industry. Three other financial variables—CR, 
AT, and GS—were not significantly related to executive compensation, so the hospitality 
industry only partially follows the pay-for-performance rule in determining executive 
compensation.  
Regarding the managerial power approach, the PDIR and SO variables were 
identified as determinants of executive compensation in the hospitality industry, while 
NDIR and NCCMT were not. These results support the idea that executives who serve on 
the board of directors receive more compensation than those who do not, regardless of 
the number of board members or the number of compensation committee members. Stock 
ownership by the executive also positively influenced executive compensation, so, in 
addition to pay-for-performance rules, how the executive was related to corporate 
governance influenced executive compensation. 
 
Quantile regression analysis 
The results of the quantile regression analysis provided more specific and concise 
results for the hospitality industry by examining the effects of each independent variable 
on different levels of executive compensation. The quantile regression analysis showed 
that the level of executive compensation was differently related to each independent pay-
for-performance and managerial power variable. The variables were related to three 
different group of compensation—the lower level (0.1-0.3 quantile), the middle level 
(0.4-0.6 quantile), and the upper level (0.7-0.9 quantile). 
 82 
Among the financial variables, the lower level of executive compensation was 
significantly related to CR and AT, while the middle and upper levels were significantly 
related to EPS and GS. That is, firm liquidity and efficiency were determinants of lower 
level compensation, while profitability in terms of EPS and GS determined middle and 
upper levels of executive compensation. In addition, the FS variable was significantly 
related to all levels of executive compensation, although the sensitivity of the lower and 
upper levels was greater than that of the middle level. Meanwhile, the coverage ratio 
(DT) was significantly related to the full range of executive compensation, although it 
was moderate. Thus, firm coverage was not differently related depending on the level of 
compensation. 
Among the four managerial power variables, only the stock ownership variable 
was differently related to levels of executive compensation in that the upper level of 
executive compensation was more sensitive than either the lower or middle levels. PDIR 
was significantly but moderately related to all levels of compensation, so it was not 
differently related to different levels of compensation.  
The results of the quantile regression analysis of the financial and managerial 
power variables also suggested that executive stock ownership and board independence 
(from the managerial power approach) influenced executive compensation in the 
hospitality industry, and that the hospitality industry also partially follows the pay-for-
performance rule to determine executive compensation. It concluded that the hospitality 
industry weakly follows pay-for-performance rule to determine executive compensation 
and higher executive’s stock ownership and board non-board independent from top 
executive may also influence on determining the level of executive compensation in 
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hospitality industry. In addition, it supports that the determinants of executive 
compensation differ between different groups of executive compensation level in the 
hospitality industry.  
 
Summary of Hotel & Casino Sub-sample 
 
OLS regression analysis 
The results of the OLS regression analysis provided a result similar to that of the 
full sample (the positive correlation of FS, EPS, DT, PDIR, and SO) for both financial 
variables and managerial power variables, except that GS was significantly related to 
compensation in the hotel and casino industry. Four financial variables (FS, EPS, GS and 
DT) were positively related to executive compensation, and the positive relationship 
between coverage ratio and executive compensation suggested that there may be a serious 
agency problem in the hotel and casino industry. In short, the results showed that the 
hotel and casino industry partially follows the pay-for-performance rule in determining 
executive compensation.  
The results of the managerial power approach were the same as that for the full 
sample in that the PDIR and SO variables were identified as determinants of executive 
compensation. Thus, the involvement of the executive in corporate governance influences  
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Quantile regression analysis 
The results of the quantile regression analysis were similar to those for the 
hospitality industry as a whole, supporting the idea that different levels of executive 
compensation are differently related to the independent variables.  
Among the financial variables for the pay-for-performance rule, the lower level of 
executive compensation was significantly related to only FS and DT. The FS variable 
was significantly related to all levels of executive compensation, although the sensitivity 
of FS on the lower and upper levels of compensation was more than it was for the middle 
level. However, coverage ratio (DT) was significantly related only to the lower level of 
executive compensation with a positive coefficient, but the sensitivity of DT on the level 
of executive compensation was moderate. Thus, firm coverage was not differently related 
to different levels of executive compensation. In addition, the coefficient graph of CR 
and AT showed that the lower level of compensation was more sensitive than were the 
middle and upper levels, which had no statistical significance. A cautious interpretation 
of this finding is that the firm’s liquidity and efficiency could have more influence on the 
lower level of executive compensation than on the middle and upper levels. 
In contrast to the lower level of compensation, the middle and upper levels were 
significantly related to EPS, and firm profitability was a determinant of the middle and 
upper levels of compensation. In addition, sales growth had different affects on the 
different levels of executive compensation, based on the coefficient graph of GS, which 
showed that the lower level of executive compensation was less sensitive to GS than were 
the middle and upper levels. 
 85 
Among the four managerial power variables, the result for the Hotel & Casino 
sub-sample was the same as that of the hospitality industry as a whole, except that the 
stock ownership variable was differently related with levels of executive compensation, 
while the other three variables—PDIR, NDIR, and NCCMT—were not.   
The results of the quantile regression analysis of the financial and managerial 
power variables also suggested that executive stock ownership and board independence 
influenced executive compensation in the Hotel & Casino industry, and that the industry 
also partially follows the pay-for-performance rule to determine executive compensation. 
While the influence of the pay-for-performance rule is weak, higher executive’s stock 
ownership and board independence from the top executive may also influence the level of 
compensation. The findings also support the concept that the determinants of executive 
compensation differ based on the level of compensation.  
 
Summary of the Restaurant Sub-sample 
 
OLS  regression analysis 
The results of the OLS regression analysis for the Restaurant industry sub-sample 
provided results similar to those of the full sample in the positive correlation of DT, FS, 
PDIR, and SO with executive compensation. However, EPS was not significantly related 
to compensation in the Restaurant sub-sample. More specifically, firm size was positively 
related with executive compensation, although the positive relationship between coverage 
ratio and executive compensation suggests that there may be a serious agency problem in 
the Restaurant industry. As for the managerial power variables, PDIR and SO variables 
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were identified as determinants of compensation in the Restaurant industry sub-sample. 
Thus, this result also shows that the level of the Restaurant executive’s involvement in 
corporate governance, along with pay-for-performance, influences executive 
compensation. 
 
Quantile regression analysis 
The results of the quantile regression analysis for the Restaurant industry sub-
sample provided similar results as those for the hospitality industry as a whole. The 
results also supported the concept that different levels of executive compensation were 
differently related to the pay-for-performance and managerial power variables.  
Among the financial variables related to the pay-for-performance rule, the lower 
level of executive compensation was significantly related to CR and AT, but not to EPS 
and GS, so firm liquidity and efficiency were determinants of lower levels of executive 
compensation. Unlike the result from the full hospitality industry sample, firm 
profitability in terms of EPS and GS was not significantly differently related to 
compensation in the restaurant industry. However, the coefficient graphs of EPS and GS 
showed that the lower level of executive compensation was less sensitive to EPS and GS 
than were the middle and upper levels of executive compensation. As was the case with 
the full hospitality industry and the Hotel & Casino sub-sample, the firm debt ratio was 
not differently related to different levels of executive compensation. The FS variable also 
provided the same results as that of the hospitality industry and the Hotel & Casino 
industry in that it was significantly related to all levels of executive compensation, and 
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the sensitivity of FS to the lower and upper levels of compensation was greater than for 
the middle level. 
The result for the four managerial power variables was a little different from that 
for the full hospitality industry and the Hotel & Casino industry sub-sample in that all 
three variables were differently related with the level of executive compensation, even 
though SO had statistical significance, while the other two did not. Contrast to other 
variables from managerial power approach, PDIR was not differently related with the 
level of executive compensation, even though the PDIR had statistical significance for 
full ranges of executive compensation.  
The results of the quantile regression analysis of restaurant industry also provide 
same conclusion that executive’s corporate governance influenced executive 
compensation, and that the restaurant industry partially follows the pay-for-performance 
rule to determine executive compensation. It condensed the previous two conclusion of 
all hospitality industry and hotel and casino industry that the restaurant industry weakly 
follows pay-for-performance rule to determine executive compensation and higher 
executive’s stock ownership and board non-board independent from top executive may 
also influence on determining the level of executive compensation in restaurant industry. 
In addition, it also supports that the determinants of executive compensation differ 
between different groups of executive compensation level in restaurant industry.  
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2. Implications of study 
 
 The findings of this study have both theoretical and practical implications that are 
useful for practitioners and researchers. Both the OLS regression analysis and the 
quantile regression analysis supported that the pay-for-performance rule and the 
managerial power approach influence executive compensation in the hospitality industry. 
The most important theoretical contribution of this study is extending the theoretical 
evidence of extant executive compensation studies in the hospitality industry by adding 
the managerial power approach. Based on the results of this study, stock ownership and 
board independence have positive effects on executive compensation, with strong 
explanatory power of regression results in terms of high figures of R-square and Adjusted 
R-square. In addition, the positive association between coverage ratio and executive 
compensation provided theoretical evidence that supported Jensen and Meckling’s 
contention regarding the incentive effects associated with debt (Jensen & Mekling, 1976). 
  The other important theoretical implication is that this study is, to the best of 
our knowledge, the first attempt that utilizes quantile regression analysis to examine the 
different effect of each independent variable (from both the pay-for-performance rule and 
the managerial power approach) on executive compensation. Most other studies have 
adopted traditional regression analysis as a statistical analysis method. Unlike traditional 
multiple regression analysis that mostly use conditional mean function, the quantile 
regression provide more specific and concise information by utilizing conditional 
quantile function. The results from this study’s quantile regression analysis also provide 
more specific and comprehensive theoretical evidence that the level of executive 
compensation is differently related to the variables from both the pay-for-performance 
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rule and the managerial power approach. Besides, the quanitle regression analysis also 
provides the coefficient patterns of each independent variable on the basis of each 
quantile of executive compensation. The coefficient patterns of each independent 
variables help estimate the sensitivity of each independent variable for the different 
groups of executive compensation level regardless of statistical significance. For example, 
compensation for an executive in the lower level of compensation group may be 
determined by the company’s liquidity and efficiency, while compensation for the 
executive in the middle or upper level may be determined by company’s profitability. 
The firm size may have a more influence on determining lower and upper level of 
executive compensation than middle level of executive compensation. With regards to 
stock ownership, the lower level of executive compensation was less sensitive than 
middle and upper level of executive compensation in hospitality industry. The practical 
contributions of this study include identifying what factors determine executive 
compensation and how these factors impact different levels of executive compensation in 
order to help illuminate executive compensation schemes in the hospitality industry, 
particularly in the hotel, casino, and restaurant segments, and thereby provide a method 
by which to judge whether an executive’s compensation has been appropriately set to 
achieve the company’s business goals. The board of directors or members of the 
compensation committee can utilize the regression formula as a guideline for determining 
executive compensation for a certain year; for example, HVS International has a formula 
of pay-for-performance to evaluate whether executive’s compensation in hospitality 
industry are well distributed (Mehegan, 1998).  
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The pay-for-performance model of HVS International is composited with only 
three major factors; firm size (market capitalization of firm), stock returns (average stock 
appreciation), and firm’s growth (EBIIDA growth) (Mehegan, 1998). The accounting 
based performance that utilized in this study is not included in the pay-for-performance 
model of HVS International, even though the accounting based firm performance should 
be considered frequently and importantly as one of firm performance estimators in the 
accounting and finance researches. Thus, the findings from this study suggests that new 
pay-for-performance model, which included accounting based performance measures, 
will provide more comprehensive information to determine level of executive 
compensation in hospitality industry.       
In addition, the results from the quantile regression analysis also suggest that 
different measures could be utilized to determine different levels of executive 
compensation. By utilizing different measures of firm performance to determine 
executive compensation, the compensation committee in the company can more clearly 
and correctly decide the level of executive compensation. For example, the executives, 
who received lower level of compensation in the hospitality industry, may find their 
performance evaluation fair by using firm’s liquidity, efficiency, and firm size as a 
decision criteria to determine their level of compensation. Contrast to lower level of 
executives, upper level of executives can be better off by being evaluated by utilizing 
more accurate criteria such as firm’s profitability and firm size to determine their level of 
compensation. 
The findings from OLS regression analysis proposed that there were a difference 
of determinant of executive compensation between Hotel and Casino industry and 
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Restaurant industry. After excluding positive effect of DT, only firm size influenced on 
determining executive compensation in the restaurant industry, whereas three financial 
variables; firm size, EPS, and firm sales growth, were identified as determinants of 
executive compensation in the hotel and casino industry. The hotel and casino industry 
appears to prefer to follow pay-for-performance rule than restaurant industry, being 
identified two additional determinants (EPS and firm’s sale growth) of executive 
compensation in Hotel and Casino industry. Thus, our findings imply that board of 
directors in the restaurant industry should make more efforts to follow pay-for-
performance rule for deciding appropriate level of executive compensation in their 
companies. In addition, the board of directors in both hotel and casino industry and 
restaurant industry also should strive to consider firm’s efficiency and liquidity as 
measures to determine level of executive compensation, because those two measures are 
also critical estimators for evaluating firm’s performance. 
In regards to the effect of the executive’s level of involvement in corporate 
governance on his or her compensation level, this study suggests that the executive who 
has enough power to influence board decision receives higher compensation. Thus, 
hospitality companies should put more effort into preventing the intervention of the 
executive’s opinion on board decisions, especially in decision-making about 
compensation. Furthermore, not only the board of directors but also all shareholders in 
hospitality companies should require the compensation committee to follow more pay-
for-performance rules, rather than submitting too much to executive involvement in 
corporate governance, to achieve clear and correct determination of executive 
compensation. 
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3. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 
Although this study contributes to the extension of executive compensation 
theoretical research in the hospitality industry by combining the pay-for-performance rule 
and the managerial power approach with recent data and by utilizing OLS regression 
analysis and quantile regression analysis, the study has several limitations.  
First, the number of executives used for this study (313) was a small sample size 
for cross-sectional data analysis. One way to increase sample size would be to include 
either other hospitality industries—such as airlines, recreation services, and theme 
parks—or other countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Hong Kong, and 
China. By increasing the sample size, the study may produce more comprehensive results 
and have more power to generalize. A comparison study regarding either industry 
difference or regional difference may also be conducted by comparing the determinants 
of executive compensation in different industries or countries. 
Second, this study focused only on corporation-level executives—such as CEO, 
vice president, and chief financial executive—in publicly held companies in the 
hospitality industry. However, the findings for this study might differ if the sample is 
focused on executives in lower, non-corporate levels. For example, general managers 
(GM) and directors in each department (e.g., marketing, sales, and housekeeping) would 
be considered as executives at the property level. In addition, this study incorporates both 
accounting-based and growth-based measures to assess firm performance, while other 
types of performance measures such as market-based performance measures (e.g., annual 
stock returns), typical performance measures in the hospitality industry, and market 
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share, were not included. Future research integrating those performance measures may 
enhance the findings. Typical financial performance measures in the hotel industry, such 
as Revenue per available rooms (REVPAR), Occupancy rate, and Average Daily Rate, 
could be adopted to examine determinants of property-level executives in the hotel 
industry on the basis of the pay-for-performance rule.  
Third, the other factors that may affect executive compensation in this study were 
derived only from the theoretical base of the managerial power approach. However, 
several studies have also considered the executive’s demographic characteristics—such 
as age, gender, and education level—as factors that influence executive compensation. 
Future hospitality researchers could seek the effect of executive demographic 
characteristics on executive compensation in the hospitality industry.  
Finally, this study utilized only executive cash compensation (salary and bonus) 
as a dependent variable to identify determinants of executive compensation. Several other 
types of executive compensations are also included in the executive compensation 
package, such as stock options, pensions, and other benefits (e.g., insurance). Thus, future 
study could include other types of compensation to provide more comprehensive and 
concise findings for the determinants of executive compensation in the hospitality 
industry. Future hospitality researchers could also study the determinants of different 
types of executive compensation (e.g., stock options).
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APPENDIX A 
EXECUTIVES IN HOTEL INDUSTRY (2006) 
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Company 
Name 
Name of 
Executive 
Total Cash 
Compensation ($) 
Current 
Director 
Colin V. Reed 823,385 O 
David C. Kloeppel 488,885 X 
John P. Caparella 336,923 X 
GAYLORD 
ENTERTAINMENT CO 
Mark Fioravanti 329,500 X 
John Emery 416,000 O 
James A. Calder 260,000 X 
Hernan R. Martinez 375,000 X 
Kimberly K. Schaefer 310,000 X 
GREAT WOLF RESORTS 
INC 
J. Michael Schroeder 250,000 X 
Stephen F. Bollenbach 1,137,830 O 
Robert M. La Forgia 1,150,000 X 
Matthew J. Hart 850,000 O HILTON HOTELS CORP 
Madeleine A. Kleiner 1,025,000 X 
Thomas F. Hewitt 400,000 O 
J. William Richardson 115,385 X 
H. Lee Curtis 244,732 X 
INTERSTATE  
HOTELS & RESORTS 
Christopher L. Bennett 246,277 X 
Edward J. Rohling 892,692 O 
Daniel E. Ellis 325,000 X LODGIAN INC 
Samuel J. Davis 109,490 X 
J.W. Marriott, Jr 1,119,506 O 
Arne M. Sorenson 609,000 X 
William J. Shaw 908,800 O 
James M. Sullivan 609,000 X 
MARRIOTT INTL INC 
Joseph Ryan 1,449,000 X 
Arthur M. Coffey 354,791 O 
Anupam Narayan 245,625 X 
John M. Taffin 208,524 X 
RED LION  
HOTELS CORP 
Thomas L. McKeirnan 158,291 X 
Steven J. Heyer 1,000,000 O 
Vasant M. Prabhu 578,667 X 
Kenneth S. Siegel 496,000 X 
Raymond L. Gellein, Jr. 599,541 X 
STARWOOD 
HOTELS&RESORTS WRLD 
Theodore W. Darnall 467,846 X 
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APPENDIX B 
EXECUTIVES IN CASINO INDUSTRY (2006) 
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Company 
Name 
Name of 
Executive 
Total Cash 
Compensation ($) 
Current 
Director 
William J. Fair       469,230  O 
Christopher S. Diamond       279,803  X 
Stan Hansen       282,367  X 
Foster A. Stewart, Jr.       287,293  X 
AMERICAN  
SKIING CO 
Helen E. Wallace      291,793  X 
Gordon R. Kanofsky       473,942  X 
Peter C. Walsh       379,154  X 
Thomas M. Steinbauer       349,154  O 
Craig H. Neilsen      854,231  O 
AMERISTAR  
CASINOS INC 
Angela R. Frost      202,212  X 
Paul W. Lowden      750,000  O ARCHON  
CORP John M. Garner      115,000  X 
William S. Boyd    1,750,000  O 
Robert L. Boughner    1,000,000  O 
Keith E. Smith      750,000  O 
BOYD  
GAMING CORP 
Ellis Landau       550,000  X 
Erwin Haitzmann      588,831  O 
Peter Hoetzinger      588,831  O 
Larry Hannappel      195,650  X 
CENTURY  
CASINOS INC 
Ray Sienko      125,609  X 
Andre M. Hilliou      207,500  O FULL HOUSE  
RESORTS INC Greg Violette       182,500  X 
Gary W. Loveman    2,000,000  X 
Charles L. Atwood    1,122,885  X 
Stephen H. Brammell      486,923  X 
HARRAHS 
ENTERTAINMENT INC 
Timothy J. Wilmott    1,228,615  X 
Bernard Goldstein      885,866  O 
Timothy M. Hinkley      748,959  X 
Allan B. Solomon      595,626  X 
Robert G. Griffin      391,932  X 
ISLE OF CAPRI  
CASINOS INC 
Lester J. McMackin       360,912  X 
Lyle Berman      707,200  O 
Timothy J. Cope      497,200  X 
Robert Wyre      300,000  X 
LAKES  
ENTERTAINMENT INC 
Richard Bienapfl      270,000  X 
Sheldon G. Adelson    1,000,000  O 
William P. Weidner    1,000,000  O 
Bradley H. Stone    1,000,000  X 
Robert G. Goldstein      965,000  X 
LAS VEGAS  
SANDS CORP 
Scott D. Henry      500,000  X 
J. Terrence Lanni     2,000,000  O 
James J. Murren     1,500,000  X 
Robert H. Baldwin     1,500,000  X 
John T. Redmond     1,500,000  X 
Gary N. Jacobs       700,000  X 
Scott D. Henry      469,230  O 
MGM MIRAGE 
Gary N. Jacobs       279,803  X 
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Company 
Name 
Name of 
Executive 
Total Cash 
Compensation ($) 
Current 
Director 
John Farahi      400,000  O 
Bob Farahi      240,000  O 
Ben Farahi      110,770  X 
Darlyne Sullivan      207,242  X 
MONARCH 
CASINO & RESORT INC 
Richard Cooley      214,954  X 
Edson R. Arneault    1,057,206  O 
Robert A. Blatt      239,203  O 
John W. Bittner, Jr      241,000  X MTR GAMING GROUP INC 
David R. Hughes      335,225  X 
H. Thomas Winn      391,347  O 
Donald A. Brennan      173,740  X NEVADA GOLD  & CASINOS INC Cathryn L. Porter      228,669  X 
Peter M. Carlino    2,800,000  O 
William J. Clifford    1,170,000  X 
Leonard M. DeAngelo    1,275,000  X 
Jordan B. Savitch      650,000  X 
PENN NATIONAL  
GAMING INC 
Kevin DeSanctis    1,572,604  X 
Daniel R. Lee    1,375,000  O 
Stephen H. Capp    1,132,154  X 
Wade W. Hundley    1,057,308  X 
John A. Godfrey      818,500  X 
PINNACLE 
ENTERTAINMENT INC 
Alain Uboldi      728,654  X 
William L. Westerman    1,000,000  O 
Robert A. Vannucci          586,265  X 
Tullio J.Marchionne      248,744  X 
Duane R. Krohn              202,330  X 
RIVERA  
HOLDINGS CORP 
Ronald P. Johnson           204,253  X 
James B. Perry       850,000  O TRUMP ENTERTAINMENT 
RESORTS Mark Juliano      775,000  X 
Jeffrey W. Jones      787,788  X 
William A. Jensen      687,596  X 
Roger D. McCarthy      652,884  X 
Martha D. Rehm      636,538  X 
VAIL RESORTS INC 
Adam M. Aron      484,417  X 
Stephen A. Wynn    2,825,000  O 
John Strzemp      600,000  X 
Ronald J. Kramer    2,800,000  O 
Marc D. Schorr    2,572,115  X 
WYNN RESORTS LTD 
Linda Chen      956,144  X 
Charles F. Champion      772,493  O YOUBET.COM INC Gary W. Sproule      482,300  X 
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Company 
Name 
Name of 
Executive 
Total Cash 
Compensation ($) 
Current 
Director 
Kenneth L. Keymer 840,000 X 
H. Melville Hope, III  350,370 X 
Harold M. Cohen  294,800 X 
Robert Calderin 345,395 X 
AFC  
ENTERPRISES INC 
James W. Lyons 319,831 X 
Michael Weinstein                                             776,652 O 
Vincent Pascal                                                339,984 O 
Robert Towers                                                 339,342 O 
Paul Gordon                                                   293,817 O 
ARK  
RESTAURANTS CORP 
Robert Stewart                             251,952 X 
Joel A. Schwartz 431,863 O 
Taka Yoshimoto 246,039 O 
Michael R. Burris 208,279 X 
Kevin Y. Aoki 140,644 O 
BENIHANA INC 
Juan C. Garcia 180,673 X 
Paul A. Motenko 312,600 O 
Gerald W. Deitchle 495,000 O BJ'S RESTAURANTS INC 
Gregory S. Lynds 304,704 X 
Ricardo Figueiredo Bomeny 129,027 O 
Roger F. Thomson 929,697 X BRAZIL  FAST FOOD CORP Todd E. Diener 1,087,754 X 
Wallace B. Doolin 544,673 O 
Kaye R. O’Leary 216,475 X 
Modesto Alcala 256,471 X 
Stephen B. Hickey 225,000 X 
BUCA INC 
Cynthia C. Rodahl 194,721 X 
Sally J. Smith             450,000 O 
Mary J. Twinem             280,000 X 
James M. Schmidt           215,000 X 
Judith A. Shoulak          230,000 X 
E. Lee Sanders             215,000 X 
BUFFALO 
 WILD WINGS INC 
James F. Hyatt 1,887,764 X 
CALA CORP Joseph Cala 300,000 O 
Larry S. Flax 539,231 O 
Richard L. Rosenfield 539,231 O 
Susan M. Collyns 315,769 X 
Thomas Beck 225,000 X 
CALIFORNIA PIZZA 
KITCHEN INC 
Sarah Goldsmith Grover 197,454 X 
Michael A. Woodhouse 937,500 O 
Lawrence E. White 425,000 X 
N.B. Forrest Shoaf 309,000 X 
Cyril J. Taylor 697,015 X 
G. Thomas Vogel 594,804 X 
CBRL GROUP INC 
David L. Gilbert 500,945 X 
Richard M. Frank 1,200,000 O 
Michael H. Magusiak 598,077 X CEC  ENTERTAINMENT INC Richard T. Huston 224,616 X 
Janet L. Steinmayer 630,769 O CENTERPLATE INC Kenneth R. Frick  262,500 X 
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Company 
Name 
Name of 
Executive 
Total Cash 
Compensation ($) 
Current 
Director 
David Overton 682,000 O 
Michael J. Dixon 285,000 X 
Peter J. D’Amelio 390,000 X 
Max S. Byfuglin 404,849 X 
CHEESECAKE  
FACTORY INC 
Debby R. Zurzolo 340,000 X 
Andrew F. Puzder  2,792,802 O 
E. Michael Murphy  1,199,008 X 
John J. Dunion  406,923 X 
Theodore Abajian  979,804 X 
CKE  
RESTAURANTS INC 
Brad R. Haley  623,130 X 
Kevin Armstrong 350,000 X 
William Koziel 256,923 X COSI INC 
Gilbert Melott 235,644 X 
Clarence Otis, Jr 1,898,313 O 
Andrew H. Madsen 1,584,856 O 
Blaine Sweatt, III 492,552 O 
Kim A. Lopdrup 826,756 X 
DARDEN  
RESTAURANTS INC 
David T. Pickens  830,256 X 
Nelson J. Marchioli 734,616 O 
Rhonda J. Parish 391,507 X 
Margaret L. Jenkins 372,628 X DENNYS CORP 
Janis S. Emplit Senior 323,031 X 
Paul J.B. Murphy, III 594,990 O 
Daniel J. Dominguez 350,941 X 
Richard P. Dutkiewicz 306,926 X 
EINSTEIN NOAH 
RESTAURANT GRP 
Jill B.W. Sisson 265,097 X 
David Goronkin 620,274 O 
Diana G. Purcel 245,028 X FAMOUS DAVES OF AMERICA INC Christopher O’Donnell 210,724 X 
James G. Flanigan  448,000 O 
Jeffrey D. Kastner 303,000 O 
August Bucci 320,000 X 
FLANIGANS  
ENTERPRISES INC 
Jean Picard  142,000 X 
Craig F. Maier 548,212 O FRISCH'S  
RESTAURANTS INC Donald H. Walker 167,632 X 
Boyd E. Hoback 170,000 O GOOD TIMES 
RESTAURANTS INC Scott G. LeFever 134,000 X 
Steven J. Wagenheim 275,000 O 
Timothy R. Cary 214,623 X GRANITE CITY FOOD  & BREWERY Monica A. Underwood 112,452 X 
Philip Gay 316,274 O 
Robert Spivak 440,000 O 
John Sola 216,193 X 
Michael Weinstock 208,415 O 
GRILL CONCEPTS INC 
Louie Feinstein 190,386 X 
Linda A. Lang  1,750,000 O 
Paul L. Schultz  1,139,750 X 
Jerry P. Rebel  803,000 X JACK IN THE BOX INC 
David M. Theno  679,100 X 
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Company 
Name 
Name of 
Executive 
Total Cash 
Compensation ($) 
Current 
Director 
Jason J. Merritt 367,500 X KONA GRILL INC Mark S. Robinow 330,750 X 
Tilman J. Fertitta 3,035,000 O 
Richard H. Liem 475,000 O 
Steven L. Scheinthal 735,000 X 
Jeffrey L. Cantwell, 300,962 X 
LANDRYS RESTAURANTS 
INC 
Richard E. Ervin 536,846 X 
Christopher J. Pappas 581,951 O 
Harris J. Pappas 581,951 O 
Ernest Pekmezaris 307,341 X LUBYS INC 
Peter Tropoli 321,398 X 
Todd B. Barnum 355,000 O 
William C. Niegsch, Jr 214,405 O 
Robert A. Lindeman 220,933 X 
MAX & ERMAS 
RESTAURANTS 
James Howenstein 161,024 X 
Saed Mohseni 344,231 X 
Douglas L. Schmick 266,346 O 
Emanuel N. Hilario 242,692 X 
David E. Jenkins 148,655 X 
MCCORMICK & SCHMICKS 
SEAFOOD 
Jeffrey H. Skeele 139,231 X 
James A. Skinner 1,177,692 O 
Matthew H. Paull 683,333 X 
Ralph Alvarez 703,077 X MCDONALD'S CORP 
Michael J. Roberts 962,500 X 
Curt Glowacki  253,085 O 
Andrew J. Dennard  155,000 X 
Dennis D. Vegas  175,000 X 
MEXICAN  
RESTAURANTS INC 
James J. Liguori 175,000 O 
Eric Gatoff 260,000 O 
Ronald G. DeVos 222,750 X 
Wayne Norbitz 463,750 O NATHAN'S FAMOUS INC 
Donald L. Perlyn 310,000 O 
Gregory L. Burns 550,000 O 
Lawrence E. Hyatt 370,000 X O'CHARLEY'S INC 
John R. Grady 381,200 X 
Richard L. Federico  585,000 O 
Robert T. Vivian  385,000 X 
Russell G. Owens  385,000 X 
P F CHANGS  
CHINA BISTRO INC 
R. Michael Welborn  315,000 O 
Ronald M. Shaich 515,000 O 
Neal J. Yanofsky 581,625 X PANERA BREAD CO 
Mark A. Borland 364,795 X 
Nigel Travis 754,231 O 
J. David Flanery 394,231 X 
John H. Schnatter 595,231 O 
William M. Van Epps 512,116 X 
PAPA JOHNS 
INTERNATIONAL INC 
Michael R. Cortino 337,996 X 
Philip J. Hickey, Jr. 737,019 O 
Eugene I. Lee, Jr 478,173 O RARE HOSPITALITY 
 INTL INC W. Douglas Benn  358,578 X 
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Company 
Name 
Name of 
Executive 
Total Cash 
Compensation ($) 
Current 
Director 
Dennis B. Mullen 751,437 O 
Michael E. Woods 339,102 X 
Todd Brighton 289,336 X 
RED ROBIN  
GOURMET BURGER 
Robert J. Merullo 339,613 X 
Ralph Rubio  287,991 O 
John Fuller  227,115 X 
Carl Arena  200,000 X 
RUBIO'S  
RESTAURANTS INC 
Gerald Leneweaver  210,000 X 
Craig S. Miller 480,000 O 
Thomas J. Pennison, Jr 200,000 X 
Geoffrey D.K. Stiles 300,000 X 
RUTHS CHRIS  
STEAK HOUSE 
David L. Cattell 200,000 X 
Leslie J. Christon 300,000 O 
Warren R. Nelson 166,904 X 
Guy C. Kathman 144,634 X 
SHELLS SEAFOOD 
RESTRNTS INC 
Christopher R. Ward, Sr. 127,927 X 
J. Clifford Hudson 1,001,372 O 
W. Scott McLain 452,390 X 
Michael A. Perry 404,975 X SONIC CORP 
Ronald L. Matlock 363,583 X 
STAR BUFFET INC Robert E. Wheaton 275,000 O 
Alan B. Gilman 500,000 O 
Peter Dunn  596,154 O 
Jeffrey Blade  219,231 X 
Gary Reinwald 245,000 X 
STEAK N SHAKE CO 
Gary Walker  242,827 X 
A. Stone Douglass  200,012 O 
Joseph L. Wulkowicz 156,000 X STEAKHOUSE  PARTNERS INC Susan Schulze-Claasen 150,014 X 
G.J. Hart 535,200 O 
Scott M. Colosi 238,174 X 
W. Kent Taylor 300,000 O 
Steven L. Ortiz 414,200 X 
TEXAS  
ROADHOUSE INC 
Sheila C. Brown 174,200 X 
Kerrii B. Anderson 620,058 O 
Jeffrey M. Cava 388,600 X WENDY'S  INTERNATIONAL INC Jonathan F. Catherwood 383,692 X 
James C. Verney 260,000 X WESTERN  
SIZZLIN CORP Robyn B. Mabe 131,000 X 
David C. Novak 1,215,000 O 
Emil J. Brolick 629,577 X YUM BRANDS INC 
Graham D. Allan 542,308 X 
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